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Abstract
We study how search frictions in the labour market a ect firms’ ability to recruit tal-
ented workers. In a field experiment in Ethiopia, we show that an employer can attract
more talented applicants by o ering a small monetary incentive for making a job applica-
tion. Estimates from a structural model suggest that the intervention is e ective because
the cost of making a job application is large, and positively correlated with jobseeker abil-
ity. We provide evidence that this positive correlation is driven by dynamic selection. In
a second experiment, we show that local recruiters underestimate the positive impacts
of application incentives.
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Selection problems occur everywhere in society. Firms want to hire talented work-
ers; universities need to attract competent students; welfare programs have to select
poor recipients. A key insight that often guides the design of selection policies is that
a costly application process can improve selection by discouraging the participation of
unwanted candidates. This logic underpins ordeal mechanisms in welfare programs
(Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Alatas et al., 2016) and is often applied in recruitment
and marketing (Ashraf et al., 2010; Bandiera et al., 2011; Alonso, 2018). In this paper,
we show experimentally that the opposite is true in an important economic context —
decreasing application costs significantly improves selection. Our results are driven by
the fact that high-ability candidates face on average higher application costs. We quan-
tify this positive correlation between applicant ability and application costs, provide
evidence on the mechanism that generates it, and show how it can be leveraged for
policy.
Our evidence comes from studying an employer who wants to attract talented work-
ers for a clerical position in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. There are two important features
in this context. First, job search and application costs are high on average; formal jobs
require an application in person, which is time consuming and often requires the use
of public transport. Second, these costs are heterogenous, as individuals have di erent
access to liquidity and live at a varying distance from employers.
Using unique high-frequency data on job search and employment, we document
that this heterogeneity generates a dynamic selection e ect. High-ability individu-
als who face relatively low application costs find work faster and stop searching for
work earlier than individuals who have similar ability, but face higher application costs.
Thus, over time, a positive correlation between ability and application costs emerges
among individuals searching for work.1 This correlation overturns the standard intu-
ition on the screening role of application costs and suggests that lowering costs may
actually be a beneficial policy for an employer in this market. We test this prediction
empirically with our experiment.
In the experiment, the employer reduces application costs by o ering a small mon-
etary payment to all job applicants. This monetary incentive is worth 4.5 USD and is
calibrated to reimburse applicants for both transport costs — an in-person application
is required for this position — and the opportunity cost of time. In a second treatment,
the employer doubles the wage o er but does not provide any financial incentive for
applications. The expected value of the wage increase is 105 USD. The employer ran-
1At the end of the paper, we present evidence from a number of studies suggesting that a similar
correlation may be found in other contexts as well, in both developed and developing countries.
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domises the o er of these two treatments over the sample of individuals who call to
inquire about the position.
Our key finding is that the application incentive improves the quality of the applicant
pool. We measure applicant ability through standardised tests of cognitive and non-
cognitive ability, job-specific experience, and GPA (a measure of academic achievement
widely used as a proxy of ability in this context).2 Applicants from the application in-
centive group have higher cognitive ability and GPA compared to control applicants,
and similar levels of non-cognitive ability and experience. The ability gains occur across
the whole distribution of ability and are particularly large at the top. GPA and cogni-
tive ability among the highest-scoring applicants invited for an interview increase by
.5 and .3 standard deviations, respectively. The number of top applicants (defined as
those with cognitive ability above the 90th percentile of the control group distribution)
doubles. We also find that raising the wage increases average applicant ability. The
magnitude of this e ect is similar to the impact of the application incentive, although
the two interventions operate through di erent mechanisms, as we discuss in detail
below.
These findings surprise local employers. To show this, we sample 196 recruiters
in the same market and ask them to predict the e ect of the application incentive, af-
ter being informed of the characteristics of the applicant pool in the control and high
wage conditions (DellaVigna and Pope, 2016). The majority of employers underesti-
mate the e ect of application incentives and the average employer incorrectly expects
this intervention to decrease applicant quality. However, when asked to invite selected
jobseekers to make an application at their firm on the basis of anonymised CVs, em-
ployers strongly prefer the applicants from the incentive treatment over the applicants
from the other two experimental groups. This gives us further evidence that applica-
tion incentives attract applicants that are preferred by employers.
The treatment e ect on ability is driven by women, and by those jobseekers who are
currently unemployed and less-experienced — all groups that do not usually perform
well in the labour market. This is not the case for the high wage treatment. This suggests
that the application incentive does not increase ability at the cost of attracting individ-
uals who have better outside options and, hence, a lower likelihood of accepting and
keeping the job. On the contrary, this intervention mostly taps the pool of low-income
jobseekers who stand to benefit the most from the job. To explore this point further, we
2We use the Raven and Stroop tests for cognitive ability (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998). For non-cognitive
skills we administer the Big-5 personality test and the Grit scale (John and Srivastava, 1999; Duckworth
et al., 2007). To identify job-specific experience, we follow Autor and Handel (2013) and collect measures
of experience in several relevant tasks.
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generate an individual measure of the net present value of the experiment’s job using
a simple calibration framework and a Post-LASSO forecast of each individual’s market
wage (Belloni et al., 2014). We find that the increase in ability is significantly larger for
the group of jobseekers that values the job the most.
We rule out several potential explanations for our findings that are not related to
job application costs. First, the interventions could induce individuals to exert greater
test e ort. To study this, we administer a task that requires e ort, but very little ability.
We do not find significant di erences in performance on this task, which provides evi-
dence against di erential test e ort. The positive impacts on GPA, a measure of ability
determined before the interventions, further support this conclusion. Second, the ap-
plication incentive could help individuals overcome self-control problems. However,
we find that incentive group applicants are as likely to be present biased as control
group applicants, which is inconsistent with this explanation. Third, subjects could
misinterpret the o er of the incentive as a signal about their quality or about the tight-
ness of the labour market. Contrary to this hypothesis, we show that the incentive does
not a ect subjects’ expectations about how long it will take them to find a new job, or
the wage that this new job would pay. We also find that the incentive is associated with
only minor changes in beliefs about the attributes of the job. We estimate that these
changes can account for only 5 percent of the total e ect of the application incentive.
To shed light on the structural features of the labour market that drive our reduced-
form results we propose a simple model of application decisions. The model captures
two key frictions in job search: application costs and uncertainty about the probability
of being o ered the job. There is only one type of vacancy, but we allow for worker
heterogeneity — jobseekers di er in terms of their ability, the magnitude of the appli-
cation costs they face, and the benefit that they derive from being o ered the job. Using
this model, we show formally that the incentive can attract better applicants in markets
where higher-ability jobseekers face larger application costs.
We identify and structurally estimate the key parameters of the model using the
exogenous variation generated by the experiment (DellaVigna, 2018). The simulated
moments closely track the empirical moments used for estimation. For example, we fit
all application rates with less than one percentage point of error. Further, the model
can match a key non-targeted moment — jobseekers’ assessment of the probability of
receiving a job o er — and replicates non-targeted patterns of the data such as the fact
that control applicants are negatively selected.
We estimate that application costs are large and, consistently with our initial de-
scriptive evidence, positively correlated with jobseeker ability. For the group of indi-
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viduals who value the job the most, the correlation between application costs and job-
seeker ability is .57. The magnitude of application costs is also substantial. At the mean,
application costs amount to 13.5 percent of the monthly wage for the same group of
jobseekers. These central findings are robust to the use of di erent assumptions about
the information available to jobseekers, alternative sets of empirical moments, and dif-
ferent restrictions on parameter heterogeneity.3 Using a local estimate of the value of
cognitive ability, we calculate that for the average firm in this market the internal rate
of return (IRR) of the application incentive is 9.8 percent. This is much higher than the
IRR of the high wage treatment, which is a costlier intervention. However, this IRR
estimate is somewhat imprecise: the 90 percent bootstrapped confidence interval has
a lower bound of -18.7 percent and an upper bound of 38.3 percent. Through coun-
terfactual policy analysis, we show that the IRR increases substantially and becomes
significantly di erent from zero when the incentive is either (i) targeted to the demo-
graphics that drive the treatment e ects (e.g. women) or (ii) o ered conditional on a
good performance on the selection test.
Our results make several contributions to the literature. First, we highlight that up-
front costs can worsen selection in an important economic context. To our knowledge,
ours is the first worker selection experiment that manipulates application costs. Some
recent experiments in developing and developed countries have manipulated the wage,
or workers’ expectations about the wage (Dal Bó et al., 2013; Deserranno, 2019; Belot et
al., 2017; Ashraf et al., 2018). These studies typically find that higher wages attract bet-
ter applicants. For example, Ashraf et al. (2018) show that o ering career incentives
enables the Zambian government to recruit more talented nurses.4 A number of pa-
pers set in the US have also studied how various contract features a ect applications
decisions (Flory et al., 2014; Mas and Pallais, 2016). Finally, a recent paper by Hardy and
McCasland (2017) studies the experimental placement of apprentices in small firms in
Ghana and finds evidence consistent with hiring frictions. None of these studies di-
rectly varies applications costs. Our findings highlight that, when jobseekers find it
costly to participate in the labour market, firms may hire better workers if they reduce
application costs.
Second, we contribute to a recent, growing literature that studies frictions in the
3A potential concern is that unobserved variation in the value of the job may inflate the estimates of
application costs and of the cost-ability correlation. While we cannot fully rule out this possibility, we
show that our key results are robust to the use of two di erent estimation strategies that plausibly reduce
this unobserved variation.
4An exception is Deserranno (2019), who finds that higher expected salaries select less motivated
candidates for a non-profit organisation in Uganda.
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allocation of talent. Previous studies have focused on the role of discrimination (Hsieh
et al., 2013), migration costs (Bryan and Morten, 2015; Imbert and Papp, 2016; Lagakos
et al., 2017), housing market failures (Hsieh and Moretti, 2015), and corruption (Weaver,
2016). We provide original empirical evidence on the importance of search frictions —
in particular, frictions in the job-application process. These frictions have been the focus
of several theoretical papers, but direct evidence on their magnitude has been limited to
date (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Marimon and Zilibotti, 1999; Rogerson et al., 2005;
Paserman, 2008; Galenianos et al., 2011). A unique feature of our study — and a key
contribution to this literature — is that search frictions are identified using exogenous
experimental variation.
Our findings are consistent with those of an emerging literature that studies spatial
frictions in urban labor markets. This literature shows that across a range of di erent
contexts — including the US, Ethiopia and South Africa — transport subsidies increase
job search intensity and impact labor market outcomes (Phillips, 2014; Franklin, 2017;
Abebe et al., 2020; Banerjee and Sequeira, 2020). These papers, however, do not observe
the counterfactual workers that would have been attracted by firms in the absence of
the program, and thus do not capture changes in the selection of talent.5 Our study,
on the other hand, documents that decreasing application costs enables employers to
attract higher-ability applicants, by incentivising a pool of female, inexperienced, un-
employed jobseekers that are unlikely to quickly secure good positions otherwise. This
suggest that job search assistance policies may have positive impacts on the allocation
of talent and motivates the implementation of new market-level evaluations designed
to investigate these e ects (Crépon et al., 2013).
Lastly, our results highlight that managers do not have accurate beliefs about the re-
turns to di erent recruitment practices and may thus fail to optimise firms’ recruitment
policies. Providing information to managers may thus be a cost-e ective intervention
in this context. These results contribute to the nascent literature on behavioural firms
(DellaVigna and Pope, 2016; DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2017; Kremer et al., 2018).
I Context
In this section we describe the labour market in Addis Ababa from the point of view of
both firms and workers. We rely both on descriptive statistics from our data on jobseek-
5Crépon and Van den Berg (2016) and McKenzie (2017a) o er recent reviews of the job search assis-
tance literature. Additionally, there is a relevant literature at the intersection of urban and labour eco-
nomics that studies spatial frictions that result from urban segregation, mostly in developed countries,
which is summarised in Gobillon et al. (2007) and Zenou (2009).
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ers and firms, as well as on data from the longitudinal, high-frequency labour market
survey collected by Abebe et al. (2020). We show that returns to cognitive ability are
likely to be substantial in this context; that job search and application costs are an impor-
tant barrier for many jobseekers; and that high-cost jobseekers may be better selected
than low-cost jobseekers.
I.A The challenge of finding high-ability workers
Finding a worker with the right ability and skills can be challenging. To collect data on
employers in Addis Ababa and their beliefs, we sample 196 firms that advertised a va-
cancy for a clerical job during a period of six weeks in 2017 and ask managers about the
HR problems they face and the HR practices they have adopted.6 The most frequently
mentioned HR challenge is finding workers with the right skills. As shown in Figure
1, about 35 percent of managers consider this to be the most pressing HR problem for
their firm. Retention, absenteeism, motivation and conduct are all mentioned less fre-
quently than hiring. In terms of HR strategies, about 60 percent of managers report
that o ering higher wages is the most e ective way to improve the quality of recruits.
Application incentives are mentioned rarely and, in practice, they are not frequently
used by firms in the city.
< Figure 1 here. >
The firms in our sample hire workers on a frequent basis. In the two months preced-
ing the interview, the average monthly hiring rate among these firms was 2.5 percent
and the average separation rate was 1.6 percent. Hiring thus occurs both to expand the
workforce and to replace workers who leave the firm. These labour flows are somewhat
smaller than those experienced by firms in the US (e.g. in the US, in June 2017, the av-
erage monthly hiring rate was 3.7 percent and the average monthly separation rate was
3.6 percent (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017)).
We also find that hiring is costly for firms, in terms of both time and money. Among
firms in our sample, average recruitment costs amount to about 104 USD and 18 hours
6The firms are selected in the following way. First, we screen all vacancies advertised on the main job-
vacancy boards or in a popular newspaper insert. To identify clerical jobs, we categorise each vacancy
according to the 2010 Standard Classification of Occupations of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. For
the full list of occupations included in the survey see Table A1. In each firm, we request to interview
the head of the selection committee – typically the head of the HR department or the firm’s CEO. We
use this sample of managers to run the second experiment reported in the paper. During the interview,
each manager first completes the CV-ranking and forecast tasks, which we describe in detail in Section
VI, and then answers the survey questions about his or her firm.
7
of sta  time (worth about 40 USD when valued at the mean wage of an HR manager
in the same firms). Total costs correspond approximately to one month of salary for
one of the high-wage jobs in the experiment. These costs do not vary substantially with
the number of applicants (many of the costs, such as those related to advertising and
developing tests and interviews, are fixed). Managers estimate that considering one
more application entails no further monetary costs and would not require more than
one hour of sta  time.
Firms usually screen workers by assessing CVs and by administering written tests
and interviews. Educational qualifications, GPA and previous work experience are the
most important variables that managers consider when they assess candidates’ CVs.
Firms often require applicants to deposit their CV and the other application materials
in person. Written tests and interviews are also used frequently. Both interviews and
written tests are used to assess general cognitive ability, specific technical knowledge,
and personality traits.
I.B The cost of finding a job and the returns to ability
From the perspective of jobseekers, finding a job is also challenging in this labour mar-
ket. First, jobseekers spend substantial amounts of time and money to identify vacan-
cies and apply for them. Using self-reported expenditure data, Abebe et al. (2020) esti-
mate that the monetary cost of searching and applying for jobs amounts to one quarter
of weekly expenditure for individuals who are actively looking for employment. To pay
for these costs, jobseekers need to frequently take up informal, short-term jobs, which
are easier to secure. These challenges are described in detail in Abebe et al. (2020). Here
we report one additional piece of descriptive evidence: jobseekers apply for a very small
fraction of the available vacancies. In our sample, for example, the average unemployed
person in the control group completes approximately two job applications in 30 days.
On the other hand, when we screened job boards and newspapers over a similar time
period, we were able to find at least 30 relevant vacancies per week. This low number of
applications is consistent with the existence of financial constraints that limit job search
intensity.
Second, ability matters: highly talented individuals — particularly those with strong
cognitive ability — earn more than low-ability individuals. In Table A2, using data from
Abebe et al. (2020), we show that a one-standard-deviation increase in a jobseeker’s
Raven test score is significantly associated with a 9 percent rise in wages, while simi-
lar improvements in conscientiousness or neuroticism are not significantly correlated
with wages. Better performance on the Raven test is also significantly related to em-
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ployment: a one-standard-deviation increase in the Raven score is associated with a 4.5
percentage point (8 percent) gain in the probability of employment. Including standard
controls for age and labour market experience does not a ect these results (Table A3).7
I.C Are jobseeker ability and application costs correlated?
Lastly, we find evidence that ability and application costs are correlated among jobseek-
ers.8 Here, we provide descriptive evidence on this correlation, and on the dynamic
selection mechanism that may drive it. In section V, we present experimental evidence
consistent with these descriptive findings. Our hypothesis is that, in a given cohort,
high-ability individuals who face low application costs find work faster and leave job
search earlier compared to individuals who have similar ability but face higher ap-
plication costs.9 Thus, low-cost, high-ability individuals become progressively under-
represented in the pool of jobseekers compared to high-cost, high-ability types. This
generates a positive correlation between ability and application costs among jobseek-
ers, which strengthens over time.
We provide evidence on this correlation using the longitudinal data collected by
Abebe et al. (2020). This dataset is ideal for this exercise as it provides fortnightly data
on the job-search decisions and employment outcomes of a sample of young adults in
Addis Ababa for the period of one year. The sample was restricted to individuals who,
at the start of data collection, did not have a formal, open-ended work contract. By the
end of the year, about half of the people in the sample found employment. The data
thus covers a period of active job search and job finding. The data also includes a Raven
test administered close to the beginning of the panel and two variables which can proxy
for search costs: a measure of financial resources (savings at baseline) and a proxy for
transport costs (distance from the city centre).
We find three pieces of evidence that support our selection hypothesis. First, high-
cost, high-ability jobseekers are less likely to find a job than low-cost jobseekers with
7For a systematic discussion on the returns to talent and, more broadly, human capital in developing
countries see Porzio (2017) and Caselli et al. (2014).
8We use the term ‘jobseeker’ to indicate those individuals who are actively looking for employment
at a given point in time. Thus, in our experimental sample, all individuals are jobseekers, as they have
called to inquire about the experiment’s position — an active job-search step. In the sample of Abebe
et al. (2020), on the other hand, we observe both individuals who look for employment and individuals
who do not.
9The reverse may happen among low-ability individuals, who have a low chance of finding formal
employment. Those who are low ability and high cost may decide to give up on the search for formal
work altogether, and restrict themselves to the informal labour market instead. On the other hand, low-
ability types who face low costs may invest in formal job search for a longer period of time.
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equal ability. This is in contrast to low-ability individuals, for whom job-finding rates
are similar irrespective of application costs. We show this point through the regres-
sion analysis reported in Table A4 in the Appendix, where we study month-to-month
transitions from job search to employment. We find that, compared to low-cost types,
high-cost individuals experience a lower increase in the probability of finding work for
the same increase in ability — a significant e ect when costs are proxied by savings
and an insignificant e ect of a roughly similar magnitude when costs are proxied by
distance. Among jobseekers with ability one standard deviation above the mean, high-
cost types have a probability of finding a job that is 8 percentage points lower than
low-cost types. On the other hand, among jobseekers with ability one standard devia-
tion below the mean, high and low-cost types have very similar job-finding rates (about
one percentage point apart).10
Second, the correlation between jobseeker ability and application costs strengthens
over the course of the year. In Figure 2 and Figure 3, we plot the fortnightly value of
the cost-ability correlation in the selected sample of jobseekers. When costs are proxied
by savings, we estimate that the correlation between jobseeker ability and application
costs grows by a significant 0.011 of a standard deviation every fortnight. When costs
are proxied by distance from the city centre, the correlation grows by a significant 0.018
of a standard deviation every fortnight. In other words, there is a growing gap in aver-
age ability between low and high-cost jobseekers (which we also illustrate showing the
separate trends of high and low-cost types in Figure A1 in the Appendix).
< Figures 2 and 3. >
Third, by the end of the year, the correlation between jobseeker ability and applica-
tion costs is large and positive. As we show in Figure 2, this correlation is large (and just
marginally insignificant) for our first proxy of applications costs — low savings. Among
the individuals who search for work in the last fortnight of the panel, those with below-
median savings have a Raven test score that is .3 standard deviations higher than those
with savings above the median. In the last fortnight of the panel, the correlation with
our second proxy — distance from the city centre — is also positive, but it is smaller
10These figures refer to the estimates reported in column 1 of Table A4, where we proxy application
costs by savings. Individuals with high savings may also have higher reservation wages. In the data,
a one standard deviation increase in savings is associated with self-reported reservation wages that are
about 0.15 standard deviations higher. Higher reservation wages should reduce the job finding rates
of high saving individuals, partly cancelling the e ect of their lower search costs. Thus, the results on
job finding that we report here likely underestimate the di erential selection that is due to search costs
alone.
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and less precisely estimated than the correlation with savings (Figure 3). Jobseekers
who live above the median distance from the city centre have a Raven test score that
is an insignificant .08 standard deviations higher than jobseekers who live below the
median distance.
Overall, this evidence supports the hypothesis that selection dynamics generate a
positive correlation between jobseeker ability and application costs. This observation
motivates a model that explicitly considers how such a correlation can a ect the hiring
outcomes of a firm, which we present in the next section.
II A simple model of job application decisions
We propose a simple model of application decisions that captures two key frictions in
job search: application costs and uncertainty about the probability of being o ered the
job. The model describes the e ects of application incentives on application rates and
on the quality of the applicant pool.
Jobseeker Characteristics. Consider a set of individuals deciding whether to apply
for the experiment’s job. For tractability, let us focus on the large-number case and
assume that these jobseekers form a continuum of unit measure.
Jobseekers di er in terms of their ability (noted T in what follows); as well as in
terms of the benefit that they derive from being o ered the job (notedB). Heterogeneity
in B captures di erences in outside options. To fix ideas, it is helpful to think of T as
the score on the Raven test (a reliable predictor of worker performance) and of B as the
monetary net present value of being o ered the job (where a negative net present value
translates into B = 0, since being o ered the job does not require jobseekers to take the
job). These are the empirical counterparts that we use for estimation, as described in
Section V.
Jobseekers who wish to apply must incur a cost (noted C), which is heterogeneous
across the population. C is the net opportunity cost of applying for the job, that is,
the economic value of all the things that jobseekers have to give up in order to apply—
typically both money and time.11 This cost is heterogeneous for two reasons. First, the
time and money required to make the application di er across jobseekers (e.g. jobseek-
ers who live farther away from the application centre have to pay a more expensive bus
fare). Second, the value of time and money di ers according to the circumstances of the
11We also allow C to be negative. This captures the fact that some people may derive a net benefit from
attending the testing sessions, independently of getting the job (e.g. because of the value of networking,
or because they learn something valuable about the market).
11
jobseeker (e.g. poorer jobseekers will find it relatively more expensive to pay the same
bus fare compared to jobseekers with better financial resources). If jobseekers dislike
being tested, C will also include the psychic or hassle costs of the application.
We characterise jobseekers along these three dimensions: (T,C,B). For simplicity,
we assume a finite number n of ’benefit types’, so that ability T and application costs C
have a continuous joint distribution for each of these B-types. More precisely, we make
the following assumptions about the distribution of characteristics across the popula-
tion of jobseekers.
Assumption 1 The benefit from receiving a job o er is given by
B 2 {b1, b2, ..., bn} where bz   0 for {z = 1, 2, ..., n}.




















for {z = 1, 2, ..., n}.
Throughout the rest of the paper we use the same notation introduced in Assump-
tion 2. That is, we use sub-indices to denote ability and costs conditional on B-types.
For example, µTz is mean ability for individuals with benefit type z. Further, we use
 CTz to denote the covariance between C and T , and ⇢z to denote the correlation be-
tween these two variables.
Application incentive and wage subsidy. We model the application incentive as a
shock that lowers application costs by an amount ⌧ . Similarly, we model the wage sub-
sidy as a shock that raises the value of the job by an amount ⌧w. In both cases the
assumption is that, in line with our empirical findings, the interventions reduce the
cost-benefit ratio without a ecting jobseekers’ beliefs about the probability of being
o ered the job upon applying.12
Selectivity and information. When jobseekers apply for the job, the employer ob-
serves their ability T . Jobseekers, accordingly, make application choices on the under-
standing that they will get the job if T > a, where a captures the perceived selectivity
of the recruitment process.
12We present empirical evidence showing that beliefs about the probability of being o ered the job are
not a ected by treatment in Section IV.E and Table A39. The fact that beliefs do not respond to treatment
is consistent with the finding that, in a beauty contest game played during the application process, 80
percent of applicants do not display strategic sophistication (Crawford et al., 2013).
12
Jobseekers face uncertainty about the likelihood of being o ered the job conditional
on application. We assume jobseekers know the cost of applying, as well as the benefit
of getting the job; but they face uncertainty about recruitment outcomes because they
have either imperfect information about the recruitment policy, or imperfect informa-
tion about their ability. We refer to these two information benchmarks as the ‘noisy
selection’ and ‘noisy ability’ cases.
In what follows, we show that in both cases the correlation between cost and ability
plays a key role in determining the impacts of application incentives. For a su ciently
large positive correlation, application incentives raise applicant ability regardless of
whether the source of uncertainty is ability or selectivity. However, these similar predic-
tions are underpinned by selection decisions made on the basis of di erent information.
In the empirical analysis, we will thus estimate the model under both benchmarks and
probe the robustness of our quantitative findings to the these di erent assumptions.
II.A Analysis
The noisy-selection case. To model this case, we assume that ability is known, but
selectivity is observed with noise: jobseekers anticipate that the threshold necessary
to get the job is a normally distributed random variable with mean µa and variance
 a. Thus, an individual with ability t believes that the probability of being o ered the
job conditional on an application is   ((t  µa)/ a), where  (·) denotes the standard
normal cumulative distribution function.
B-type jobseekers with cost Cz = cz and ability Tz = tz will apply for the job if and
only if
  ((tz   µa)/ a)   cz/bz(1)
From equation 1 it is easy to see that if Tz and Cz are not correlated, then an applica-
tion subsidy that shifts the cost-benefit ratio without a ecting beliefs about selectivity,
will lead to more but worse applications on average. This is the standard logic that
often guides selection policies—a costly application process can improve selection by
discouraging the participation of unwanted candidates, who are privately informed
about their low ability. Thus, subsidising application costs may reduce average appli-
cant ability.
Proposition 1. Suppose (T,B,C) are observable and distributed according to Assumptions 1
and 2, with ⇢z = 0. Further assume jobseekers anticipate that the threshold necessary to get the
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job is a ⇠ N (µa,  a). Then it follows that for each B = bz > 0, the application incentive (i)
increases application rates, and (ii) decreases the average ability of applicants.
Proof. Within each B-type, jobseekers who receive the application incentive face a pos-
itive shock that lowers their application costs by an amount ⌧ . This means that the
application rate among these jobseekers is given by
Pr (Cz    ((Tz   µa)/ a) bz + ⌧)(2)
Similarly, the expected ability of applicants in this group is given by
E
 
Tz | Tz     1 ((Cz   ⌧)/bz)  a + µa
 
(3)
If Cz is not correlated with Tz, then it is trivial to check that the first expression is in-
creasing in ⌧ , and the second expression is decreasing in ⌧ .
From equations 2 and 3 it is easy to see that application incentives generally operate
through two related but di erent channels. On the one hand, application incentives
weakly reduce the ability of marginal applicants at any given level of costs; and on the
other hand, they attract additional high-cost applicants at any given level of ability.
When ability and costs are not correlated (i.e. when ⇢z = 0) only the first e ect
matters to determine the impact of the intervention on average applicant ability—this
is the standard intuition, captured in Proposition 1. Reducing the cost-benefit ratio
increases the number of applications, but lowers the average quality of the applicant
pool.
In contrast, when ⇢z > 0, application incentives activate two forces that act in op-
posite directions. Lowering the cost-benefit ratio increases applications by attracting a
larger share of high-cost applicants, but these new applicants tend to have higher abil-
ity on average. If the correlation between ability and costs is strong enough, the second
channel dominates and the intervention has a positive selection e ect.
In Figure 4 we illustrate this intuition graphically. The application region is shaded
in blue ((Cz   ⌧)/bz     ((Tz   µa)/ a)), while the superimposed purple contours show
the density of the joint distribution of jobseekers (Pr (Tz = tz, Cz = cz)). As the figure
shows, the application incentive shifts the application threshold to the right, for all
levels of ability. However, given the positive correlation between Tz and Cz, this ex-
pansion of applications adds a larger share of high-cost, high-ability jobseekers. As a
consequence, the average ability of applicants increases.
Figure 4 also highlights that, when cost and ability are not correlated, we would
expect applicants to have higher average ability than non-applicants. However, the
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opposite may be true for a su ciently strong cost-ability correlation. Indeed, in our
experimental data, non-applicants have on average higher ability than applicants (as
measured by their GPA score). We will come back to this point in the structural section
and show that, while we do not target this moment explicitly, the model nonetheless
correctly reproduces it.
< Figure 4 here. >
Proposition 2. Suppose (T,B,C) are observable and distributed according to Assumptions 1
and 2. Further assume jobseekers anticipate that the threshold necessary to get the job is a ⇠
N (µa,  a). Then it follows that for each B = bz > 0, the application incentive (i) increases




Proof. See Appendix B
Proposition 2 captures the intuition behind our main experimental result. The ap-
plication incentive attracts a group of marginal applicants who face larger application
costs compared to control group applicants; and because the correlation between costs
and ability is positive among jobseekers, these marginal applicants have, on average,
higher ability than the applicants in the control group. If the cost-ability correlation
is su ciently large, this indirect channel dominates the standard channel presented in
Proposition 1, and the application incentive raises average applicant ability.
This proposition also illustrates the key role played by uncertainty. As noise  a
grows, the condition on the cost-ability correlation becomes weaker. Intuitively, when
the outcome of an application is highly uncertain, application costs play only a limited
screening role. In this case, the ‘standard intuition’ e ect is small. Thus, a moderate
indirect e ect is su cient to obtain a positive impact on applicant ability.
The noisy-ability case. Let us now consider the second scenario. Here we assume
jobseekers are confident that the selection threshold is fixed at some level a, but they
do not directly observe their ability.13 Since C and B are known, and are potentially
informative about ability, we assume that jobseekers can use these variables to update
13Jobseekers can be wrong about the selection threshold due to overconfidence as in Spinnewijn (2015)
and Banerjee and Sequeira (2020). Further, as explained above, we assume that jobseekers do not revise
their beliefs about a in response to treatment. It is possible to show that if we assume instead that a is the
true selectivity threshold, which responds endogenously to treatment, application incentives increase
applicant quality if and only if the cost-ability correlation is positive. In Proposition 3 below, we show
that a positive cost-ability correlation is similarly required for the case where a is exogenous. So our key
results here are not driven by this assumption.
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their belief about the probability of being o ered the experiment’s job. To fix ideas on
this set of assumptions, consider that jobseekers can observe the application conversion
rates of people with similar observables, and can use these to make inferences on the
probability of a job o er. For example, consider an individual who lives in a central
neighbourhood (low C) and has a strong educational record (high expected wage/low
B). Under our assumptions, this person believes that their chances of being o ered
the experiment’s job are the same as those of other applicants from her neighbourhood
with a similar educational record.
Formally, we have that B-type jobseekers with cost Cz = cz will apply if and only if
cz  c⇤z, where c⇤z is the level of costs for which
Pr(Tz > a | Cz = c⇤z , B = bz) = c⇤z/bz(4)
From equation 4 it is clear that in this case the ’standard intuition’ that we discussed
before is muted. Jobseekers do not directly observe Tz, so they are not able to self-
select directly on ability at the application stage. In fact, if Cz is not correlated with Tz,
then subsidising applicants would increase the number of applicants, but these new
applicants would be a random selection from the pool of jobseekers; so the application
incentive would yield no impact on the expected ability of applicants.
Importantly, however, when ⇢z > 0 the indirect channel still operates, because the
incentive still attracts on the margin applicants who face larger application costs com-
pared to control group applicants. So in this case too, if costs and ability are positively
correlated, the application incentive intervention can yield a positive selection e ect.
In Figure 5 we illustrate this graphically.
< Figure 5 here. >
The application region is again shaded in blue (cz < c⇤z), and the superimposed pur-
ple contours show the density of the joint distribution of jobseekers (Pr (Tz = tz, Cz = cz)).
As the figure shows, the application incentive shifts the application threshold to the
right, for all levels of ability. However, given the positive correlation between Tz and
Cz, this expansion of applications adds a larger share of high-cost, high-ability jobseek-
ers; and as a consequence, the average ability of applicants increases.
Proposition 3. Suppose (T,B,C) are distributed according to Assumptions 1 and 2. Assume
jobseekers are confident about the selection threshold a, but they only observe C and B, which
they can use to update their beliefs about the probability that they will pass the recruitment test
T > a. Then for each B = bz > 0, the application incentive (i) increases application rates, and
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(ii) increases the average ability of applicants, if and only if





Proof. See Appendix B
Taken together, Propositions 2 and 3 show that the pivotal role of the cost-ability
correlation does not depend on whether the uncertainty about the outcome of the ap-
plication stems from imperfect information over ability, or imperfect information over
the recruitment policy. On the other hand, the nature of uncertainty can a ect the se-
lection decision in other ways. For example, the ‘standard intuition’ e ect only exists in
the case where jobseekers know their own ability. Empirically, we do not know which
set of assumptions better approximates the information available to jobseekers. Thus,
in the structural estimation section, we will bring both information benchmarks to the
data and probe the robustness of our findings.
III The experiment
III.A Design
We study the recruitment of workers for clerical jobs in Addis Ababa. The experiment
takes place over eight consecutive fortnights. On the Sunday at the beginning of each
fortnight, the positions are advertised in a local newspaper and in the main job vacancy
boards of the city. The advertisement describes the position as a three-months fixed
term appointment based in Addis Ababa and specifies that candidates must hold a
university degree or a vocational diploma. Interested individuals are invited to call a
specified phone number to get more information about the position and the application
process. The deadline for applications is on the Friday of the same week. The positions
are based at a local organisation specialised in research and data collection.14
A small team of enumerators answers the phone calls of interested jobseekers fol-
lowing a standardised script. First, they ask a short number of questions capturing
14At the time of the experiment, the organisation employed about 60 permanent workers and 50 fixed-
term-contract workers with a similar profile as those recruited for the experiment. All workers hired
as part of the experiment were employed for three months and were paid the same wage (which corre-
sponds to the wage o ered in the high-wage condition discussed below). This was a surprise for those
workers selected under the low-wage o er. The fact that the actual wage would di er from the initial
o er was not disclosed to any of the sta  involved in the surveys and experiment. The same organisation
was contracted for the data collection required for the other parts of this study (e.g. the survey of other
employers to elicit beliefs).
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callers’ socio-demographic characteristics and work experience. Second, they give some
information about the position. Third, they explain that, in order to apply for the posi-
tion the jobseeker has to attend a testing session at a dedicated application centre, on a
specified day. Jobseekers have to bring to the session a CV, a cover letter and proof of
identity.
We randomly vary two attributes of the position across callers: the wage and whether
we o er an application incentive. Callers assigned to the control group are informed that
the position pays a monthly wage of 1,600 ETB (74 USD) and are not o ered the appli-
cation incentive. Callers assigned to the application incentive group are also told that the
position pays a wage of 1,600 ETB per month. In addition, these callers are informed
that, if they complete the testing session, they will receive a monetary payment of 100
ETB (4.5 USD). This payment is presented as a reimbursement of the costs jobseekers
may incur in the application process. Finally, callers assigned to the high wage group are
told that the position pays a wage of 3,200 ETB (148 USD) per month and are not o ered
the application incentive. We calibrated these wages at the 35th and 75th percentile of
the distribution of earnings for similar positions using data from Abebe et al. (2020).
Using jobseekers’ assessment of the probability of getting the job, we calculate that the
expected value of the high wage o er is worth about 105 USD for the average subject.
All jobseekers who call before the application deadline on a given fortnight are as-
signed a testing day.15 This can be from Monday to Friday of the second week of that
fortnight, or on the first Monday of the following fortnight. To reduce the risk of con-
tamination across experimental conditions, individuals assigned to di erent treatment
groups are invited to take the test on di erent days.16 Each treatment group is assigned
to two of these six testing days. This assignment of treatments to testing days is ran-
domly varied every fortnight. If a jobseeker cannot attend the testing session on the
proposed day, we allow them to attend the other testing session assigned to his or her
treatment group for that fortnight.
We call back all jobseekers four weeks after the first phone call. In this second inter-
view, we ask a set of questions about the job applications that individuals have made
15We do not allow jobseekers to call on more than one fortnight. After each phone call, enumerators
check our database and disqualify the person if they have called on a previous fortnight.
16To further reduce the risk of contamination, callers are told that the employer is hiring for multiple
positions. This provides a simple explanation for why di erent callers may o ered di erent conditions.
Specifically, callers in the control group are told that they have been assigned to a position called ‘position
A’. Callers in the application incentive and high wage groups are informed that they have been assigned
to positions ‘B’ and ‘C’, respectively. We do not provide any information on why a jobseeker has been
assigned to a particular position. If asked about this, the enumerator will reply that one major factor is
to have a similar number of candidate for each position.
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in the 30 days after the first phone call. Completion of this second phone interview is
incentivised with a monetary payment of 20 ETB (.85 USD). We show the full timeline
of a typical hiring round in Figure A2 in the Appendix.
We o er three jobs per fortnight – one per treatment group.17 For each position, the
five applicants with the highest score on an index of cognitive ability (which combines
the scores on the Raven and Stroop tests) are invited for an interview. The employer
decides who among these interviewees is given the job.
As much as possible, the experiment follows the usual recruitment protocols of the
employer, which are similar to those of other employers in this market. Importantly, in
Addis Ababa it is standard practice not to include information about the wage in the
initial advertisement for a position. Further, as explained in Section I, written tests like
the one we employ are common.
III.B Measuring applicant ability
We measure the ability of the individuals that apply for the experiment’s job with a
number of popular personnel selection tests. These tests are good predictors of worker
productivity and are routinely used by firms worldwide (Chamorro-Premuzic and Furn-
ham, 2010). We also collect information about relevant work experience and GPA scores
– two variables that local employers use to screen applicants. Finally, we also collect in-
formation about economic preferences.18
We measure cognitive ability with the widely used Raven and Stroop tests. The
Raven test measures fluid intelligence, the ability to make meaning out of complex in-
formation and to reproduce this information. Several meta-analyses have identified
the Raven test as the single best predictor of worker productivity (Schmidt and Hunter,
1998; Raven, 2000). This test has been widely used in the recent economics literature to
measure worker ability (Dal Bó et al., 2013; Beaman et al., 2013; Abebe et al., 2020). The
Stroop test is a popular test of cognitive control, the ability to direct and discipline at-
tention which is required to perform complex tasks (Diamond, 2013). We use a version
of the Stroop task developed by Mani et al. (2013).
For non-cognitive skills we use two widely used and validated scales: the big five
inventory (BFI-44) and the grit scale (John and Srivastava, 1999; Duckworth et al., 2007).
We focus on three facets on non-cognitive ability which have been identified as particu-
17In a small number of cases, we combine two fortnights of the same treatment group together. When
this happens, we o er only one job to the applicants assigned to that treatment group in these two fort-
nights.
18We provide a detailed discussion of each measure in Appendix C.
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larly relevant for work performance: conscientiousness, neuroticism and grit. These re-
spectively capture a careful and vigilant attitude at work, the ability to deal with stress-
ful situations, and the capacity to persevere through challenges (Chamorro-Premuzic
and Furnham, 2010). We perform standard validity checks for the psychometric mea-
sures and satisfy accepted thresholds (e.g. see Table A5 for Cronbach ↵). Laajaj and
Macours (2017) emphasise the value of performing validity tests when psychometric
scales are used in new contexts. We also administer scales measuring locus of control
and confidence.
Further, we collect information about relevant work experience. For this purpose,
we use the classification of tasks developed by Autor and Handel (2013). This includes
the following categories: physical, routine, problem-solving, managerial, mathemat-
ical, and client-interaction tasks. For each of these, we ask participants to report the
number of months of experience in jobs that required them to perform that task on
a regular basis. We focus on routine, problem-solving and managerial tasks, as these
were identified by the employer as the most relevant types of experience.
We aggregate the individual measures in indices of cognitive ability, non-cognitive
ability and experience. Each index is constructed as the sum of the standardised values
of three measures, as reported in Table A6 in the Appendix (Anderson, 2008).19
Finally, we measure four types of economic preferences: an incentivised measure of
time preferences, and non-incentivised measures of risk preferences, social preferences
and level-k rationality. The task to measure time preferences is an adapted version of
the game by Augenblick et al. (2015). In this task, participants have to allocate units
of work across two work sessions. For risk preferences and social preferences we use
questions from the Global Preferences Survey (Falk et al., 2016b). Finally, we administer
a simplified and non-incentivised version of the beauty contest game to elicit level-k
rationality (Crawford et al., 2013).
III.C The sample, randomisation and attrition
Over the eight fortnights of the experiment, 4,689 jobseekers called to inquire about
the position — an average of about 590 individuals every fortnight. The number of
fortnightly callers stayed constant over the course of the experiment, suggesting that
19We think of the three components of the index as representing three distinct facets of a particular
ability. We thus give each component of the index equal weight. Results, however, are qualitatively
unchanged if we weight by the inverse of the covariance matrix. Further, ideally, we would standardise
each test score by the variance of that test for a pool of applicants attracted at the average wage. We are
unable to do this, as we either attract applicants at a below-average or at an above-average wage. We
thus use the variance of a given test among all applicants in order to standardise the value of that test.
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the positions generated sustained interest among jobseekers. Table 1 reports summary
statistics for the population of individuals who called to inquire about the position.
The typical caller is young, male and has some work experience. The average age is 26.
15 percent of the sample is 30 or older. Women account for 21 percent of the sample.
On average, callers have 28 months of wage-work experience. This masks substantial
heterogeneity, as 47 percent of the sample has no work experience. Callers also have a
variety of educational backgrounds.
< Table 1 here. >
We randomise the o er of the two treatments using a stratification rule in order to
improve covariate balance (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009). We create strata of six consec-
utive callers of the same gender and same level of work experience.20 In each stratum,
we randomly allocate two callers to the control group, two callers to the application
incentive group and two callers to the high wage group. These callers are invited to a
testing session at the application centre during the following week. There are two test-
ing sessions per treatment group, per fortnight. We randomise the allocation of testing
sessions to days of the week. We do this in a single draw for all eight fortnights and
re-randomise until we have an allocation that is balanced across days of the week.21
We find that covariates are balanced across treatment groups and that attrition is
modest and uncorrelated with treatment. 1,557 callers are assigned to the control con-
dition, 1,559 to the incentive condition, and 1,573 to the high wage condition. Table 1
reports descriptive statistics and balance tests for the characteristics of the callers that
we measure during the first phone interview. The joint orthogonality tests show that,
overall, characteristics are balanced across treatment groups. Individual covariates are
also generally balanced.22 Further, appendix Table A9 shows that the assignment of
individuals to treatment is strongly balanced across weeks. In terms of attrition, in
the second phone survey, we interview 93.5 percent of the sample (attrition is thus 6.5
percent). This is consistent with recent studies with similar populations in urban East
Africa (Abebe et al., 2020). Figure A3 shows that attrition is not systematically related
20We define an experience dummy using the median number of months of work experience of callers
in the pilot.
21 The randomisation rule is that (i) each treatment should be allocated two testing days each fortnight,
and (ii) no treatment should be allocated, overall, more than three or less than two sessions on the same
day of the week. For this exercise, we consider the Monday session on the the following fortnight as
being a distinct ‘day of the week’.
22The only exception is a 3 percentage point di erence between the high wage group and the control
group in the proportions of callers who are unemployed and wage employed.
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to treatment status and Table A8 confirms that the sample remains balanced after attri-
tion.
Using data from the 2013 Labour Force Survey (LFS), we also show that our exper-
imental sample resembles in many ways the population of jobseekers in Addis Ababa.
In particular, average age and work experience in our sample match those of a compara-
ble sample of jobseekers from the LFS, as we show in Table A10 in the online Appendix.
We find some di erences in terms of gender (women are under-represented in our sam-
ple) and unemployment duration (the long-term unemployed are under-represented in
our sample). These di erences are likely due to the fact that women and the long-term
unemployed search at lower intensity and hence are less likely to respond to the ad
placed by the employer. As we will show in Section IV, these groups of jobseekers tend
to drive the treatment e ects on applicant quality. Our estimates are thus likely to be a
lower bound of the treatment e ects that would be observed in a more representative
sample.
III.D Empirical strategy
Our objective is to study the impacts of the interventions on application rates and on
the ability of applicants.23 We estimate e ects on application rates using a regression
model of the following form:
applyi =  0 +  1 · incentivei +  2 · high wagei + b + ui,(5)
where applyi is a dummy that captures whether person ihas applied for the job, incentivei
and high wagei identify individuals who have been o ered the application incentive
and the high-wage treatment, andb are stratum dummies (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2009).
The coe cients  1 and  2 capture the change in application rates generated by the ap-
plication incentive and the high wage o er. This model is estimated over the baseline
sample, that is, over the sample of individuals who called to inquire about the position.
We use a similar model to study the e ects of the interventions on expectations and
other job-search activities. These outcomes were measured during the second phone
call and thus we use the second phone call sample to run this additional analysis.24
We study impacts on the ability of applicants by measuring changes in the condi-
tional mean and conditional quantiles of the measures of quality discussed in the pre-
vious section. For this analysis, we restrict the sample to all applicants. We measure
23All reduced-form analysis was pre-registered. In the Online Appendix, we list a number of devia-
tions from our original plan motivated by data and fieldwork challenges.
24As discussed in the previous section, attrition between the two surveys is limited and uncorrelated
with treatment. Furthermore, the sample remains balanced after attrition.
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changes in mean applicant ability by estimating a simple OLS regression model of this
form:
yi =  0 +  1 · incentivei +  2 · high wagei + ui,(6)
where y is a measure of worker ability. Further, we estimate a conditional quantile
function of the following form, using a standard quantile regression model (Koenker
and Hallock, 2001):25
Q✓(yi|Xi) =  0 +  1 · incentivei +  2 · high wagei.(7)
For each measure of worker quality y,  1 and  2 capture the change in conditional
quantile ✓ caused by the treatments. For example, suppose that we are studying the
90th percentile of the distribution of cognitive ability and that we obtain an estimate of
 1 of 1. This would say that an applicant at the 90th percentile of the distribution in the
incentive group has a cognitive ability score that is one point higher than an applicant
at the 90th percentile of the control distribution. A key implication of this quantile shift
is that the proportion of applicants who score above the 90th percentile of the control
distribution increases. This suggests that, to study changes in applicant ability, we can
also compare the probability that an applicant scores above a given threshold across
the two applicant groups. In the results section, we show that our findings are robust
to the use of this alternative empirical strategy.
We focus the quantile analysis on five percentiles: 90th, 75th, 50th, 25th, 10th. We
also present a test of stochastic dominance first proposed by Barrett and Donald (2003).
Stochastic dominance occurs when the CDF of one distribution is weakly smaller than
the CDF of the other distribution at all points of the support and strictly smaller at least
at one point. The null hypothesis of the Barrett and Donald (2003) test is that the CDF
of one distribution is weakly smaller than the CDF of the other distribution. To have
evidence that distribution A dominates distribution B, we should thus both (i) reject
that B is weakly smaller than A and (ii) fail to reject that A is weakly smaller than B. In
the results section, we report and interpret the findings of both tests.
We report robust standard errors throughout the paper.26 Further, we control for
multiple-hypothesis testing by using sharpened q-values that control the false discovery
rate (Benjamini et al., 2006).27
25In models (6) and (7) we do not include the randomization block dummies. This is because we esti-
mate these models on the sample of applicants, which, by design, does not include all of the individuals
that were originally randomised into the three experimental conditions.
26For quantile regressions, robust standard errors are computed using the methods proposed by
Machado and Silva (2000) and the Stata command developed by Machado et al. (2011).
27We have three indices of ability, so each individual test is repeated three times, forming a family
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IV Results
IV.A Impacts on application rates
We find that the incentive has a large and significant e ect on applications. Individuals
in the incentive group are 11.5 percentage points more likely to apply for the position
than individuals in the control group. 41 percent of subjects in the control group apply
for the position, so this treatment e ect amounts to a 28 percent increase in application
rates. Further, we find that individuals in the high-wage group are 18.6 percentage
points more likely to apply to the position. Thus the application incentive generates an
increase in applications that is about two thirds of the increase in applications that can
be obtained by doubling the wage. The two e ects are statistically di erent from each
other. We report these results in Table 2.
< Table 2 here. >
As shown in Figure A4, impacts on application rates are stronger in the upper part
of the GPA distribution. For example, the increase in applications generated by the
incentive treatment in the lowest decile of the GPA distribution is close to 8 percentage
points. In the top decile of the distribution, the increase is a significant 14.5 percentage
points. These observations suggest that the overall e ect on the quality of the pool of
applicants, both at the mean and at the top of the distribution, is positive. We discuss
these results in detail in the next subsection.
IV.B Impacts on the quality of the applicant pool
The application incentive improves the quality of the applicant pool. This is our most
important finding. The incentive raises average cognitive ability among applicants by
.25 points, or .12 of a standard deviation (Table 3). This e ect is significant at the 5
percent level and is robust to the correction for multiple comparisons.28 Applicants
in the incentive group perform significantly better in both the Raven and the Stroop
tests. Compared to applicants in the control group, they answer correctly 1.2 additional
questions in the Raven test and they require 2.6 fewer seconds to complete the Stroop
of hypotheses. To calculate q-values, we first compute standard p-values for each test in a given family.
Then, we run the sharpened procedure proposed by Benjamini et al. (2006) using these p-values. The
q-values we obtain express the expected proportion of false discoveries that we need tolerate if we want
to reject the null hypothesis of a given test.
28This estimate is also not sensitive to the exclusion of tests carried out on specific days of the week. We
show this in Figure A6 in the Appendix. Also, the findings in this section are qualitatively unchanged
when we weight the index by the inverse of the covariance matrix (Table A17,A18, A19).
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task. These treatment e ects are of a broadly similar magnitude as those documented
in previous worker selection experiments. For example, Dal Bó et al. (2013) document
an increase in performance on the Raven test of about half a correct answer. We report
the full results for the individual tests in Table A11 in the Appendix. We also find
that the applicants attracted by the incentive have GPA scores that are a significant .1
standard deviation higher than control applicants (Table A12). This is an important
result as many firms in Addis Ababa use GPA scores to assess candidates’ ability. Thus
the applicant pool improves also in terms of the screening criteria used by local firms.
The increase in quality occurs both at the top and at the bottom of the distribution.
These results hold when looking at quantile shifts, number of top and bottom appli-
cants, and average quality of the top applicants. We look at each of these in turn. First,
we find that the cognitive ability scores at the 90th, 75th and 25th percentiles improve
significantly (Table 3). These e ects correspond to about .1 a standard deviation of the
cognitive ability index; the respective q-values are always below .15. We also estimate
positive, but insignificant e ects at the 50th and 10th percentiles. Overall, a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test rejects the equality of the cognitive ability distribution in the control and
incentive groups (p=.038). Second, we document a large e ect on the number of top ap-
plicants (defined as individuals above the 90th percentile of the cognitive ability score
in the control group). Top applicants nearly double from 63 in the control group to
117 in the incentive group. This e ect is generated by a combination of higher appli-
cation rates, and a significant, 5.3 percentage points increase in the proportion of top
applicants in the applicant pool (see Table A13 in the Appendix). At the same time, the
number of applicants at the bottom of the distribution is fairly stable. For example, com-
pared to the control condition, the application incentive attracts only nine additional
applicants who score below the 10th percentile of the control distribution. Third, we
find that the average ability of top applicants increases significantly. In Table A14 we
show regressions of average cognitive ability and GPA scores for samples comprising
the top 20, 10 and 5 applicants for each job (the top 5 applicants are invited for the in-
terview). We document sizeable increases in both scores between .2 and .5 standard
deviations. In particular, the application incentive increases the GPA scores of the top
5 applicants by a significant .5 standard deviations and the cognitive ability score by a
large but insignificant .3 standard deviations.
Consistently with the results for specific quantiles, we find suggestive evidence that
the cognitive ability distribution among treated applicants stochastically dominates the
control distribution. This is an attractive feature if the firm’s objective is to maximise
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the ability of its hires.29 We see the characteristic pattern of stochastic dominance when
we plot the cumulative distributions of cognitive ability for the two groups (Figure 6).
We find a similar pattern if we look at the results of the Raven test, the Stroop test and
GPA separately (Figures A8, A9 and A10 in the Online Appendix). Using the formal
test of Barrett and Donald (2003) we find no evidence to reject the hypothesis that the
CDF of the incentive distribution is weakly smaller than the CDF of the control distri-
bution (p=.949). This result is consistent with dominance of the incentive distribution
over the control distribution. However, it also consistent with the equality of the two
distributions. We thus also test the null hypothesis that the CDF of the control distri-
bution is weakly lower than the CDF of the incentive group. For this test we obtain a
p-value of .136, giving us suggestive evidence of stochastic dominance.
The high-wage o er also attracts an applicant pool with higher cognitive ability.
We estimate significant positive e ects at the mean, and at the 90th, 75th and 25th per-
centiles (see Appendix Figure A11 for the full distribution). The magnitude of these
point estimates is smaller than those we obtained for the application incentive, but we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two treatments have the same e ect. The
significant estimates of the impact of the high-wage o er are associated with q-values
above .1 (and in two cases above .2), suggesting these results are generally not robust
to the multiple-comparisons correction.
< Table 3 here. >
< Figure 6 here. >
Lastly, we are unable to find significant di erences in non-cognitive ability or expe-
rience between applicants in the incentive group and applicants in the control group.
The high-wage o er significantly increases median non-cognitive ability, but does not
significantly a ect the other percentiles of the distribution. Tables A15 and A16 report
the results from these regressions.30
29 Stochastic dominance makes it possible to unambiguously rank distributions for objective functions
that are increasing in the value of the random variable (Deaton, 1997; Barrett and Donald, 2003). Thus,
in our setting, the dominant distribution would be preferred both by firms who maximise the expected
quality of hires, and by ‘risk-averse’ firms with an objective function that is increasing and concave in
quality. The comparison would not be unambiguous, however, if firms value having a smaller pool of
applicants or if acceptance rates are lower in the dominant group. We consider the first point in Section
V. Regarding the second point, we show below that the increase in quality generated by the incentive is
concentrated among those jobseekers with the weakest outside options. These jobseekers are likely to
have the highest acceptance rates. This further increases the value of the applicant pool attracted by the
application incentive.
30We are similarly unable to document systematic impacts on ability when we ipsatise the psychome-
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IV.C Impacts on search for other jobs and job-search outcomes
We do not find evidence that the application incentive distorts individuals’ search for
other jobs or impacts their labour market outcomes. This is not surprising, as the small
cash incentive ensures that applying to the experiment’s job does not deplete the re-
sources available to search for other positions. To study the search for other jobs, we
use the data collected during the second phone interview, 30 days after the initial phone
call, and a regression model with same form as model (5). We investigate whether the
interventions change the number of applications made, the amount of money and time
spent on job search, the number of interviews and job o ers obtained, and whether
the jobseeker is currently working in a new job. We report these results in Table A21
in the Appendix.31 For the application incentive, we consistently estimate small and
insignificant coe cients.
On the other hand, we find that individuals in the high-wage group have signifi-
cantly worse outcomes than the controls: they obtain .04 fewer interviews, .03 fewer
o ers and are about 2 percentage points less likely to be working in a new job. In
Table A23 we also document that individuals in the high-wage intervention are sig-
nificantly less likely to have obtained a job in their desired occupation, a job that they
see themselves doing in the long run or a job with an open-ended contract. One pos-
sible explanation for these results is that the individuals that are induced to apply to
the experiment’s job by the higher wage run out of resources to search for other jobs.
The e ects of the high-wage o er on search e ort are indeed negative: the interven-
tion is associated with a significant 10 percent decrease in the number of visits to the
job vacancy board — a costly form of search that requires the use of public transport
(Table A24). In Table A21 we also document e ects on applications that point in the
same direction, but are smaller and statistically insignificant: a 4 percent decline in the
number of applications to other jobs, and a 3 percent decline in the time spent on job
applications.
tric measures to correct for acquiescence bias (the tendency to agree with any statement, regardless of
the content of that statement). We report these additional regressions in Table A20.
31In this Table, we exclude the application to the experiment’s job in the definition of the dependent
variables. In Table A22, on the other hand, we report estimates for the total number of applications,
which includes the application to the experiment’s job. Under this alternative definition, we estimate
that both interventions are associated with a marginally insignificant increase of about .1 applications
per jobseeker.
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IV.D Mechanisms: Who drives the increase in quality?
We study the heterogeneity of treatment e ects along several dimensions. These in-
clude demographic characteristics (gender and age), labour market variables (employ-
ment status and work experience) and a variable capturing the net present value of the
job to each jobseeker. We calibrate this variable by comparing the control wage of the
experiment’s job to a forecast of the wage that each individual can expect to be paid in
the market, based on their observables. We describe in detail the calibration procedure
in Appedix F. For each dimension of heterogeneity x, we estimate a model of this form:
yi = 0 +  1 · incentivei · I(xi = 1) +  2 · high wagei · I(xi = 1)
+  3 · incentivei · I(xi = 0) +  4 · high wagei · I(xi = 0)
+ I(xi = 1) + b + ui.(8)
Model (8) gives us separate estimates of the e ect of treatment for individuals for
whom x = 1 and individuals for whom x = 0. When a variable is continuous, x is
dummy that splits the sample at the median of that variable. For each regression and
each treatment, we present a test of the hypothesis that there is no heterogeneity in the
e ect of that treatment (H0 :  1 =  3 for the incentive, and H0 :  2 =  4 for the high-
wage o er). We bootstrap the standard errors of the regressions studying heterogeneity
with respect to the value of the job, to reflect the fact that we are using a generated
regressor. Results are reported in Tables A25 to A33 in the Appendix.
We find that the increase in cognitive ability caused by the incentive is significantly
stronger among women, the unemployed, the less experienced, and for those individ-
uals whom we estimate to value the job the most (Table A27). Impacts are also much
larger for applicants below the median age, but in this case we cannot reject a null hy-
pothesis of no heterogeneity (p = 0.162). These are all groups that on average fare worse
in the labour market and that respond more strongly to job-search support (Card et al.,
2010; Abebe et al., 2020). Further, with the exception of work experience, we cannot doc-
ument heterogenous impacts of the high-wage o er with respect to these dimensions.
The magnitude of the di erences in impacts across groups is often large. For example,
among males, the e ect of the incentive on average cognitive ability is close to zero.
Among women, on the other hand, the cognitive ability score more than doubles (and
the Raven test score increases by about 4.7 points or about .4 of a standard deviation, as
reported in Table A28). We also document significantly larger e ects for women at the
90th and 75th percentiles of the cognitive ability distribution (Table A31). We illustrate
these results graphically in Figure A7, where we show that the proportion of female top
applicants grows from 21 percent in the control group to 33 percent in the application
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incentive group.
On the other hand, we do not find systematic heterogeneity in the treatment e ect
on the probability of applying for the position (Table A25). For each dimension of het-
erogeneity, we can use the estimated impacts on applications rates and group-specific
quality to break-down the total treatment e ect in three parts: a compositional e ect, a
within-group e ect for the first group, and a within-group e ect for the second group.
This exercise, which we report in Table A32, shows that the impact of the interven-
tion is largely driven by within-group improvements in quality among those groups
that have weaker employment prospects (women, youth, the unemployed, the inex-
perienced). This suggests that the e ectiveness of the intervention could be improved
by targeting the subsidy towards these groups, a point which we explore in depth in
Section V. Further, when we use all observables to obtain a forecast of market wages
and then calculate the present value of the job, we find that virtually all of the increase
in ability is driven by individuals with a low forecasted market wage and hence a high
present value of the job. This finding helps us rule out a mechanism whereby the incen-
tive increases ability by attracting individuals with strong outside options and hence a
relatively modest personal gain from getting the job. On the contrary, it suggests that
the application subsidy attracts high-ability individuals with weak outside options and
thus has the potential to increase allocative e ciency.
Table A32 also shows that compositional e ects play a minor role in explaining our
results. In Section V, we show that our model can reproduce this feature of the ex-
perimental findings. The absence of compositional e ects is explained by the fact that
costs are highly heterogeneous within demographic groups. This means that there is
substantial overlap between group-specific cost distributions and, thus, that in all de-
mographic groups there is a sizeable number of individuals who face high application
costs.
IV.E Alternative explanations
In this section we consider seven alternative explanations for our results that are unre-
lated to application costs. We do not find evidence suggesting that these channels drive
the e ect of the application incentive.
Do the interventions change test e ort? First, we consider whether the treatments af-
fect test e ort. This could happen for a number of reasons. For example, applicants in
the wage intervention may exert more e ort in the selection test since the higher salary
makes the position more valuable. We study this alternative hypothesis in two ways.
29
First, we note that the interventions have significant treatment e ects on GPA (reported
in Table A12), a measure of ability that was determined before treatment and that hence
cannot be confounded by di erential test e ort. Second, we follow Dal Bó et al. (2013)
and collect a direct measure of test e ort through a task that requires e ort, but very
little ability. In this task, applicants have to transcribe ten strings of meaningless let-
ters. In Table A36 we study whether two measures of performance on this task — the
number of strings that have not been transcribed and the number strings that have been
transcribed incorrectly — improve with treatment. We find that the average applicant
in the control group fails to transcribe 0.08 out of 10 strings and transcribes incorrectly
0.7 out of 10 strings. Applicants in both treatment groups perform in a similar and sta-
tistically indistinguishable way to control applicants, both in terms of of mistakes and
in terms of number of strings transcribed. For example, the average applicant from the
high-wage intervention makes an additional .067 mistakes — a very small di erence.
We obtain similar results if we study the likelihood of making any mistake or failing
to transcribe any string. Altogether, this evidence suggests that the treatments do not
change test e ort.
Do individuals in the incentive group apply primarily to collect the monetary pay-
ment? Next, we explore whether application incentives attract individuals that are
primarily interested in the immediate monetary payment, and not in the position. We
consider two implications of this hypothesis. First, if this hypothesis was correct, we
would expect lower test e ort among treated applicants. However, as discussed above,
applicant test e ort is very similar across experimental groups. In Figure A12 we fur-
ther show that the distribution of test e ort in the control and incentive groups looks
remarkably similar at all point of the support (and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails
to reject the equality of these distributions). Second, we would expect that, compared
to the high-wage condition, incentives would generate an increase in application rates
that is more skewed towards low GPA jobseekers, who have a low probability of secur-
ing the position and should hence discount the wage increase more heavily. This is the
opposite of what we observe when we plot application rates against GPA (Figure A5).
Does the application incentive help present-biased individuals commit? Third, we
explore the hypothesis that application incentives help present-biased individuals fol-
low through on their intention of applying to the experiment’s job. On the day the ap-
plication is due, a present-biased individual who plans to take the test may be tempted
to deviate from his or her plan. The incentive makes it more costly for them to change
their mind — as they would forgo both the future opportunity of getting the job and the
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immediate monetary payment — and can thus help them act in a more time-consistent
manner. While plausible, this explanation is not supported by the data. We do not find
evidence suggesting that the incentive attracts applicants who have di erent time pref-
erences, which we measure through an incentivised task similar to the task proposed
by Augenblick et al. (2015) (described in detail in Appendix C). In Table A34, we re-
port structural estimates of average present bias, discounting and cost of e ort, which
are obtained by pooling all individual decisions in the incentivised task. We find that,
on average, individuals have a value of the present-bias parameter   that is less than
one, indicating time consistency. This is very similar across treatment groups. In the
same table, we further show that the discounting and cost-of-e ort parameters of ap-
plicants from the incentive group are similar and statistically indistinguishable from
the controls. The high-wage treatment, on the other hand, attracts significantly more
patient applicants. This is not surprising, as the present value of the high-wage o er
is greater for patient individuals. In Table A35, we then present additional regression
results for individual measures of present bias, obtained by running a separate estima-
tion for each applicant. About 30 percent of applicants are present biased according to
this measure. This share goes up by an insignificant 2 percentage points among treated
applicants. Thus, overall, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that the e ect
of the incentive is driven by present biased individuals. In Table A35, we also show that
there are no significant di erences in other economic preferences (e.g. risk and social
preferences), which we measure through non-incentivised questions.
Do the interventions make the job more salient? Fourth, we study whether the treat-
ments induce jobseekers to pay more attention to the experiment’s job. In our context,
individuals may su er from stress and cognitive load. As a result, they may be inatten-
tive, especially when the benefits of an action accrue in the future, and may thus forget
to apply to some of the jobs they are interested in (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013). The
interventions could induce jobseekers to pay more attention to the experiment’s job be-
cause they increase the cost of forgetting, or because they make the job stand out among
others (Gabaix and Laibson, 2005; DellaVigna, 2009). This increased salience would re-
duce the likelihood that individuals forget to apply to the position, potentially driving
some of the impacts on application rates that we have documented.
We study this alternative explanation in two ways. First, we note that a mechanism
of this type is likely to work against the direction of our findings on ability, as cogni-
tive load temporarily decreases cognitive ability (Mani et al., 2013). Second, we directly
test this explanation by leveraging the fact that salient information is more likely to be
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remembered (Botta et al., 2010; Santangelo and Macaluso, 2013). If the interventions
make the position more salient, we would expect treated jobseekers to remember more
accurately the information about the job that was given to them. We implement this test
in Table A37, using a question in the second phone call that asks jobseekers to recall the
wage that was discussed in the first phone interview. In the control group, we find
that about 69 percent of individuals report the correct wage. The remaining subjects
either report an incorrect figure, or declare that they do not remember. The average re-
port has an absolute mistake of 167 ETB. Importantly, we are unable to find systematic
evidence of better recollections for the application incentive group. However, we find
that individuals in the high-wage group recollect the wage of the position more accu-
rately: they are more likely to report the correct figure (by 3.9 percentage points), and
they make smaller absolute mistakes (by 45 ETB on average). These results are robust
to controlling for whether individuals have applied for the job.32 Thus, overall, while
these results suggest that the wage intervention increases salience, the evidence does
not support the hypothesis that this is also the case for the incentive intervention.
Do the interventions change jobseekers’ beliefs about their prospects in the labour
market? We study whether individuals update their beliefs about their prospects in
the labour market. This could be the result of a revision in the beliefs that individuals
hold about their own employability, or in the beliefs about the state of the labour market.
For this test we use two questions from the second phone interview. In the first question,
we ask subjects to forecast the number of weeks that it would take them to find a job
that paid at least their reservation wage. In the second question, we ask respondents
to report the wage that they expect this job will pay.33 We find that the application
32Applicants have a second chance to inquire about the wage during the application process and may
thus have better recollections for reasons unrelated to salience. Since the treatments increase application
rates, this may bias upwards the coe cients in columns (1) and (2) of Table A37. To correct for this, the
models reported in columns (3) and (4) control for whether the individual has applied for the job. This
control variable captures an endogenous mediator and hence the models in columns (3) and (4) should
be interpreted as a basic form of mediation analysis (Acharya et al., 2016). We present a formal mediation
analysis at the end of this section.
33 To elicit expectations about the wage, we follow the method of Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009).
We ask respondents to report the minimum and maximum wage that the job can pay. We then identify
the midpoint between these two values and ask respondents to report the probability that the job will
pay more than the midpoint. Following Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009), we assume that beliefs fol-
low a triangular distribution. This distribution is fully characterised by an upper bound, a lower bound
and a mode. The maximum and minimum wage reported by respondents identify the upper and lower
bounds. Given the two bounds, the value of the CDF at the midpoint identifies the mode of the distri-
bution.
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incentive does not have a significant e ect on either of these beliefs. The high-wage
o er, on the other hand, significantly increases expected wages by about 8.5 percent.
Table A38 in the Appendix reports these results.
We also do not find evidence that the interventions change jobseekers’ beliefs about
the probability of getting the experiment’s job. We show this result in Table A39 in the
Appendix. This finding is consistent with the low levels of strategic sophistication that
are documented in a simplified beauty contest task (Crawford et al., 2013). In general,
applicants are overconfident about the likelihood of getting the experiment’s job. This is
consistent with recent research showing that beliefs about individual performance are
characterised by overconfidence in several contexts, including job search (Malmendier
and Tate, 2015; Spinnewijn, 2015; Banerjee and Sequeira, 2020).
The impacts on beliefs do not vary significantly according to the ability of the job-
seeker (as proxied by their GPA score) or previous work experience. We show this in
Figures A13 and A14 in the Online Appendix, where we report impact estimates for
various subgroups and a p-value for a test of the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity.
Do the interventions change jobseekers’ beliefs about the attributes of the job? We
test whether the treatments a ect the beliefs that individuals hold about the charac-
teristics of the experiment’s job. To test for this, in the second phone call we collect
jobseekers’ beliefs about several attributes of the job: holidays, non-standard working
hours, the degree of autonomy, how satisfying the work will be, whether they will learn
new skills, etc... We regress each of these beliefs on the two treatment dummies and
report results in Table A40 in the Appendix. We find that the application incentive has
a modest significant e ect on two of these dimensions: the proportion of people who
think the job will have more than four days of holidays per month goes up by 2.5 per-
centage points, and the proportion of people who think that the job will help them to
find a job in the future goes up by 3.4 percentage points. These two expectations are
weak predictors of the decision to apply for the experiment’s job. Among control group
individuals, the belief that the job has long holidays raises the probability of making
an application by 7.8 percentage points, while the belief that this job will help with job
search in the future raises the probability of making an application by 8.2 percentage
points. To assess the potential e ect of this channel on application rates, we multiply
the treatment e ects on the beliefs by the e ects that these beliefs have on application
rates and add up. The result is that this channel can explain a change in application
rates of about half a percentage point. In other words, net of this e ect, the applica-
tion incentives would raise applications by 11 percentage points (as opposed to 11.5
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percentage points).
We provide additional evidence that application incentives do not change beliefs
about job attributes with a survey experiment on a new sample of jobseekers. We se-
lect 724 jobseekers through random visits at the same job-vacancy boards where the
experiment’s job was originally advertised.34 During the survey, we give subjects some
information about a hypothetical job, including salary and nature of the job, randomis-
ing whether this description mentions a monetary application incentive or not. We then
ask respondents whether they expect the job to have a number of attributes (since the
questions refer to a hypothetical job, respondents are not rewarded for correct answers).
In Table A42 we show that, in this new sample, application incentives do not generate
any significant or sizeable change in job-attribute beliefs. Together with the results on
retrospective beliefs reported in Table A40, this evidence points against the possibility
that the impacts of the application incentive intervention are driven by a misperception
of job attributes.35
Mediation analysis. We use mediation analysis to quantify the contribution of the
changes in beliefs and salience caused by the wage intervention to its overall impact
on application rates. We do this by estimating the average controlled direct e ect (ACDE)
of this intervention (Vansteelandt, 2009; Acharya et al., 2016). This quantity is defined
in a framework where a treatment can have both a direct impact on the outcome of
interest and an indirect impact which runs through a mediator. For example, the wage
intervention may have a direct impact on application rates as it makes the position more
lucrative, but also an indirect e ect if it makes potential applicants more confident.
The ACDE is defined as the direct e ect of the intervention, that is, the e ect that the
34We carried out this survey between December 2019 and January 2020, as part of a di erent project.
We report basic descriptives for this new sample in Table A41. The jobseekers in this sample have broadly
similar characteristics to the jobseekers in our original experiment: they are 24 years old on average, 20
percent of them were born in the capital city, about 40 percent have work experience and, those who
do, have worked for 20 months on average. The corresponding figures for our original sample are: 26
years of age, 24 percent born in Addis Ababa, 53 percent have work experience and, those who do, have
worked for 28 months on average. The two samples however di er in terms of gender: 49 percent of
respondents in the new sample are female, as the sample was stratified by gender, while only 21 percent
of the respondents in the original experiment are female. Table A41 also reports a standard battery of
balance tests. The overall test of orthogonality confirms that treatment assignment is balanced. However,
we find some imbalance (p=0.08) in terms of the proportion of jobseekers who are currently unemployed.
35As an additional check, we debriefed the sta  from the original experiment to find out whether
treated applicants asked more or di erent questions about the position during the first phone call. The
sta  was unable to recollect any systematic di erences in the questions asked by treated and control
subjects.
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intervention would have if the mediator was not allowed to respond to treatment and
hence the indirect e ect was removed.36 Here, we focus on the ACDE on application
rates and consider a list of potential mediators that we showed to be a ected by the
interventions in the analysis above: beliefs about labour market prospects, beliefs about
the attributes of the experiment’s job, salience of the position.
We find that the ACDE of the high-wage o er on application rates is 9 percentage
points (with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 3 to 13 percentage points). This
is significantly smaller than the original estimate reported in Table 2 (which was 18.7
percentage points, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 15 to 22 percentage
points), suggesting that the mediators have a quantitatively large influence on applica-
tion rates in the high-wage group. The controlled direct e ect of the incentive, on the
other hand, is quantitatively similar and statistically indistinguishable from the original
treatment e ect (the demediated e ect is 13 percentage points, slightly larger than the
original e ect of 11.5 points). This is not surprising, as we only find evidence of large
and systematic e ects on the mediators for the wage treatment.
IV.F Other characteristics of applicants
We report one final set of results on the characteristics of applicants. We are particu-
larly interested to shed light on a set of productivity-relevant traits that may not be cap-
tured by our main indicators of ability. These include confidence and motivation, and
personal constraints that may a ect the ability to work. In Table A43, we report regres-
sions for a comprehensive battery of psychometric measures — grit, locus of control,
core self-evaluation, self-esteem as well as the individual big-five traits. We are unable
to find any meaningful di erences between control and incentive applicants: all e ect
sizes are markedly below .1 standard deviation and are precisely estimated. Further,
in Table A34 and Table A35 we show that treated applicants have similar economic
preferences and a similar cost of e ort as control applicants. As explained above, our
measure of cost of e ort is obtained in a real-e ort task where individuals have to allo-
36In order to identify the ACDE we have to assume sequential unconfoundedness. In a case where treat-
ment is randomly assigned, this amounts to assuming that there are no omitted variables which confound
the e ect of the mediator on the outcome, conditional on treatment and a set of pre-treatment controls
(Acharya et al., 2016). Given this assumption, we can identify the ACDE with a simple two-step proce-
dure. In the first step, we regress the outcome on the mediator, the treatment dummies, a set of controls,
and the interaction between the mediator and all other variables. We then obtain the predicted value
of the outcome fixing all mediators to zero. This is the ‘demediated’ outcome. In the second step, we
regress the demediated outcome on the treatment dummies. The coe cients from this regression give
us the estimate of the ACDE.
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cate a certain amount of work across two di erent work sessions. In this task, treated
applicants make similar allocation decisions as control applicants — a result that sug-
gests that they have a similar ability to schedule work in advance and to work without
interruption as control applicants. Overall, the results of this further analysis suggest
that, apart from the di erences in cognitive ability highlighted above, the interventions
attract pools of applicants that have characteristics similar to those of control applicants.
V Structural analysis
In this section we discuss the identification and estimation of a structural model, based
on the theoretical framework presented in section II. Our estimated structural parame-
ters indicate that application costs are large, heterogeneous and positively related with
ability. These results are consistent across a number of robustness tests.
V.A Identification and estimation
Our objective is to estimate the parameters that characterise the joint distribution of
costs (C) and ability (T ), for each level of the value of the job (B). In our main empirical
model, we allow for two possible values of B. Thus, we need to identify ten parameters
for the joint distribution of T and C of low and high-B jobseekers. We also estimate
the magnitude of the shocks to costs and benefits of the two interventions (⌧ and ⌧w)
and the parameters that capture perceived selectivity. In the case where ability is noisy,
we estimate a single selectivity parameter a (which may di er from true selectivity if
jobseekers have an inaccurate perception of the selection process). In the noisy selec-
tion case, we assume that jobseekers believe selectivity is an independent, normally
distributed variable with mean µa and standard deviation  a. Thus, we have a total
of thirteen parameters to estimate in the noisy-ability case, and fourteen parameters in
noisy-selection case.37
To identify these structural parameters we use a core set of fourteen empirical mo-
ments, which we obtain from data on applications and test scores. We then show that
our results are robust to the introduction of two additional moments based on self-
reported beliefs data, which provide additional information on jobseeker uncertainty.
For the core set of moments, we first use the control application rate and the control
average and standard deviation of applicant ability (three moments). Further, we use
the treatment e ects on application rates and on average applicant ability of the two
37For noisy-ability case, these parameters are: µTl, µCl,  Tl,  Cl,  TCl, µTh, µCh,  Th,  Ch,  TCh, ⌧ , ⌧w
and a. For the noisy-selection case, these parameters are: µTl, µCl,  Tl,  Cl,  TCl, µTh, µCh,  Th,  Ch,
 TCh, ⌧ , ⌧w, µa and  a.
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interventions (four moments). For the high-wage group, we use the demediated treat-
ment e ect on application rates, which nets out the indirect impacts of this intervention
on applications through changes in beliefs and salience (see Section IV.E for a full dis-
cussion of demediation). We compute these moments separately for low and high-B
jobseekers, giving us a total of fourteen core moments. Jobseekers’ average belief about
the probability of being o ered the job, for the low and high-B group, give us the two
additional moments.38 We present analytical formulas for all moments in Appendix D.
The parameters are jointly identified by these empirical moments. The basic intu-
ition for identification is as follows. The six control group moments — the average and
standard deviation of applicant ability and the application rate — describe the trun-
cated distribution of T among applicants. These moments enable us to identify the
mean of application costs (µC) — a key driver of the application decisions — and, con-
ditional on this, the mean and standard deviations of ability (µT ,  T ) among all jobseek-
ers. Then, the treatment e ects on application rates identify the severity of the shocks ⌧
and ⌧w and the standard deviations of costs  Ch and  Cl. Further, the treatment e ects
on applicant ability identify the covariance between cost and ability, as shown in Propo-
sition 2 and Proposition 3. Finally, perceived selectivity is identified by the treatment
e ects on ability and by jobseekers’ forecasts of the probability of being o ered the job.
Tables A45 and A46 summarise these intuitions.
We proxy ability T with the score on the Raven test and then study whether our
findings change if we use the cognitive ability score instead. Further, to measure B
— the value of the experiment’s job net of outside options — we first obtain a post-
LASSO forecast of the wage a jobseeker can expect to earn given their observables. We
then calibrate B using the wage paid by the experiment’s job in the control condition,
and an informed assumption about the probability of finding an alternative job at the
jobseeker’s individual market wage. We discuss this calibration in detail in Appendix
F. For the estimation, we discard individuals with a negative B since our model is only
specified for the case whereB > 0. We split the remaining individuals (about 61 percent
of the sample) at the median level of B. On average, an individual in the high-B group
gets a net, discounted benefit from the experiment’s job of about 594 ETB (27.3 USD). For
the low-B group, the benefit is about 407 ETB (18.7 USD). A possible drawback of this
strategy is that the residual variation in the value of the job that is not captured by the
empirical measure of B may inflate our estimates of application costs and of the cost-
38We elicit beliefs about the probability of being o ered the experiment’s job retrospectively. During
the second phone call, we ask subjects to report the belief that they held at the time of deciding whether
to apply to the position or not (that is, shortly after the first phone call). We show that these beliefs are
not a ected by the interventions in Table A39 in the Online Appendix.
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ability correlation. We explore this point empirically in Section V.D, by studying the
robustness of our key results to estimation strategies that leverage additional variation
in B, for example, by grouping individuals by the tercile in the distribution of B that
they belong to.39
To estimate the model we use a classical minimum distance estimator (Wooldridge,
2010). We save the empirical moments in a vector m. For a parameter vector ✓, we solve
the model and calculate the simulated moments mS(✓). We update ✓ in order to solve:
✓̂ = min
✓
[mS(✓) m]0 · J(m) 1 · [mS(✓) m] ,(9)
J(m) is a diagonal matrix that contains the variance of each moment, ensuring that
more precisely estimated moments get a greater weight in estimation. In line with the
recent literature, we use this simple weighting matrix instead of the theoretically op-
timal weighting matrix, which may su er from small sample bias (Altonji and Segal,
1996). We calculate J(m) using a bootstrap with 1,000 replications. We perform infer-
ence using a bootstrap (keeping J(m) fixed). We include the estimation of B and the
demediation procedure in all bootstrap exercises.
Table 4 presents our main structural results. We include two sets of estimates for
the noisy-ability case, obtained with the core set of moments and with the extended set
of moments. We also include two sets of estimates for the noisy-selection case, again
obtained with the two di erent sets of moments. In what follows, we first describe
the empirical fit of these four versions of the model, and then discuss the parameter
estimates and their robustness.
< Table 4 here. >
V.B Model fit
We generally obtain a good fit between empirical and simulated moments. We show
this in Figure 7 below (and report the underlying moments in Tables A48-A51 in the
online Appendix). In both the noisy-ability and the noisy-selection cases, the simulated
39These strategies capture variation in B that is generated by market wages. On the other hand, we
are unable to capture variation in B that comes from heterogeneity in the value of non-work time, as
we do not have individual-level data on the likely determinants of this variable (e.g. childcare, access to
government welfare programs, etc.). An additional point to note is that our interventions may have an
impact on jobseekers’ beliefs about market wages. In Table A38, we presented evidence suggesting this
may be the case for the wage intervention, but not for the application incentive intervention. This means
that the shock ⌧w that we estimate captures the net e ect of two countervailing forces: a direct impact
on the value of the experiment’s job (which raises the value of B) and an indirect impact on the value of
jobseekers’ perceived outside options (which lowers the value of B).
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moments fit the empirical moments tightly. Simulated application rates are generally
within one percentage point of the true empirical moment. The mean and standard
deviation of the Raven test in the control group are matched almost exactly. Finally, we
also fit fairly precisely the treatment e ect on applicant ability. Overall, the noisy-ability
and noise-selection cases generate similar goodness-of-fit statistics, which we report in
the last row of Table 4.
< Figure 7 here. >
Further, the two versions of the model that do not target beliefs are able to reproduce
jobseekers’ substantial overconfidence about the probability of being o ered the job.
Among individuals with B > 0, the average forecast of this probability is 47 percent.
This is outside a reasonable range, since the employer hires one person approximately
every 115 applicants. Importantly, when we do not the explicitly target these beliefs, our
estimates imply a similar high degree of overconfidence. When ability is known, the
implied average forecast of the probability of being o ered the job is 64 percent. When
ability is noisy, the average forecast is 35 percent. In addition, when we explicitly target
these beliefs, both models match them very closely.
The estimated model also replicates a key non-targeted pattern in the data: in the
control group, applicants have on average lower ability than non-applicants (as shown
in Figure A4 for GPA, the only measure of ability that we observe for all jobseekers).
This pattern intuitively suggests that the marginal applicant is better than the average
applicant and hence, that the employer can attract better applicants by intervening on
either the cost or the benefit margin. The estimated model reproduces this key pattern
for both the noisy-ability and the noisy-selection case.
Finally, the elasticity of the simulated moments with respect to the model param-
eters broadly supports the intuition for identification presented above. As in Kaboski
and Townsend (2011) and Lagakos et al. (2017), we first compute all moments using the
estimated parameters. We then shock by one percent the value of each parameter at a
time, and compute the percent change in the simulated moments. This illustrates the
drivers of identification close to the minimum of the estimation problem. We report
the results in Tables A52-A55 in the Appendix. The estimated elasticities are generally
consistent with the intuitions for identification discussed above. For example, Table
A52 shows that the elasticity of the treatment e ect of application incentives on appli-
cant ability with respect to the cost-ability covariance is 3.8 (a 1 percent change in the
covariance leads to a 3.8 percent change in the simulated moment). For the moments
that describe application rates or ability in the control group, the elasticity with respect
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to this parameter is much lower. Tables A53 and A55 also illustrate how jobseekers’ be-
liefs help identify perceived selectivity: these moments are most responsive to changes
in the selectivity parameters.
V.C Parameter estimates
V.C.1 Noisy-ability case
Our estimates for the noisy-ability case indicate that application costs are large, hetero-
geneous, and positively correlated with ability. We report these estimates in the first
two columns of Table 4. Column (1) reports the results obtained using the core set of
empirical moments. For the high-value group, the mean of application costs is 217 ETB.
This amounts to 13.5 percent of the monthly salary o ered to individuals in the con-
trol group, or to about 36.5 percent of the estimated value of the job. For the low-value
group, mean costs are about 136 ETB, or 8.5 percent of the salary and 33.5 percent of
the value of the job. We also estimate that application costs have a large dispersion, in
both groups. The standard deviation of application costs is about 245 ETB for the high
B group and 193 for the low B group.
The correlation between ability and costs is 0.57 for the highB group and 0.64 for the
lowB group. These estimates imply a large increase in ability as we move along the cost
distribution. For example, a high-B jobseeker with costs one standard deviation above
the mean has a Raven score that is about 6.4 scores higher than the average jobseeker (a
15 percent increase). Using the average Mincerian return to cognitive ability reported
in Section I, we estimate that the value of this additional ability would be 146 ETB per
month.
When we introduce jobseekers’ beliefs, we obtain similar estimates of the cost-ability
correlation and somewhat higher estimates of average costs (column (2) of Table 4). The
estimated selectivity threshold is lower, which helps fit jobseekers’ beliefs. All other
parameters estimates are qualitatively unchanged.
V.C.2 Noisy-selection case
Our estimates for the noisy-selection case confirm that application costs and the cost-
ability correlation are substantial. We report these estimates in the last two columns of
Table 4. We estimate correlation coe cients that are consistent with those of the noisy-
ability case. However, mean application costs are substantially larger. When we use the
core set of moments, we estimate costs of 273 ETB and 383 ETB. When we bring in the
additional moments, we estimate costs of 206 and 286 ETB.
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Uncertainty about selectivity is very large. As discussed in Section II, this uncer-
tainty moderates the size of the “standard intuition” e ect. We can show this by com-
puting the increase in average applicant ability that we would observe if the correlation
between cost and ability was set to zero (and all other parameters were equal to those
reported in column (3) of Table 4). Thus, in this simulation, the treatment e ect on
ability is driven entirely by the “standard intuition” e ect. We calculate that, for the
high-B group, the drop in average ability would correspond to 0.002 correct answers
on the Raven test. This is less than 1 percent of the e ect on ability that we obtain if we
use the estimated positive value of the correlation, which suggests that the screening
role of application costs is limited in our context.
V.C.3 Plausibility checks
To explore the plausibility of our application cost estimates, we leverage jobseekers’
own reports about the monetary and time costs of other job applications.40 The average
monetary expenditure for one application is 50 ETB.41 Further, jobseekers report that
the average time required for one application is about 5 hours — which is broadly in
line with the time required to apply for the experiment’s position. We estimate that the
value of this time is between 56 ETB and 89 ETB.42 The sum of monetary and time costs
is thus between 106 and 139 ETB. This should be seen as a lower bound to the total
cost of the application since it does not include non-material costs (related to stress,
attention, e ort, etc.). Given this, our structural estimates for the noisy-ability case (136
40This data was collected during the second phone interview. The question we asked referred to ap-
plications to positions other than the experiment’s job, in the 30 days between the two phone interviews.
While most jobseekers make at most one job application in this period, a small group sends a large a
number of applications. This last group also spends much less money and time per application, which
complicates the interpretation of these cost values. Thus, in the analysis that follows, we use the average
figures reported by jobseekers that make only one application.
41This figure is likely to reflect the multiple trips jobseekers make to complete the application process
(in-person application, written test, interview) as well as printing CVs and other one-o  expenses. It is
thus not an estimate of the cost of a single day of commuting.
42The opportunity cost of time is high for people in our sample, who may not have a formal, stable
job, but often have access to casual, informal income-generating opportunities. These opportunities are
typically as remunerative, on an hourly wage basis, as entry-level formal jobs in the bottom part of the
wage distribution. Thus, if we value the time spent on the application at the rate of the salary o ered in
the low wage condition of our experiment (assuming a 5-days, 40-hours working week and 2 statutory
days o  per month), the opportunity cost of time is about 56 ETB. This goes up to 89 ETB if we assume that
a whole day worth of income-generating opportunities is lost — a reasonable assumption since one may
have to forgo, say, a day of casual work at a construction site in order to spend 5 hours at the application
centre.
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and 217 ETB, with the core moments) are broadly consistent with these figures. On the
other hand, the estimates for the noisy-selection case are noticeably larger.
Second, to assess the plausibility of our correlation estimates, we run a simple simu-
lation based on the selection patterns we documented using the high-frequency panel.
This panel tracks one cohort of jobseekers over the course of one year. For our sim-
ulation, we assume that the labour market is composed of multiple cohorts that live
for three years, shrinking in size by 20 percent per year. Further, we assume that the
cost-ability correlation in each cohort evolves as in the cohort that we observe in the
panel data. Given this set-up, we find an implied steady-state correlation between cost
and ability of about .35, which confirms that a substantial correlation is plausible in this
labour market. However, this benchmark is lower than our structural estimates of the
correlation parameter (which are between 0.57 and 0.64). This may be due to the fact
that our proxies of application costs are noisy, which would bias the simulation down-
wards. Alternatively, our structural estimates may be inflated by variation in the value
of the job that is not captured by our empirical measure of B. We explore this point in
the robustness section below.
V.D Robustness
The results on application costs and their correlation with ability are robust to the use
of several alternative estimation strategies. For this robustness analysis, we focus on
the noisy-ability case, which gives the most conservative estimates. We perform the
following checks: (i) we use the cognitive ability score as opposed to the Raven score
to measure ability, (ii) we let, in turn, a, ⌧w, and ⌧ di er by B group, (iii) we predict B
using an OLS model instead of the post-LASSO estimator and (iv) we allow for three
types of B in the population. We report all key results in Table A56.
First, we find that, when we use the cognitive ability score to measure ability, we
estimate very similar levels of costs and a higher cost-ability correlation. These results,
reported in the first column of Table A56, suggest that our structural findings are not
driven by our particular measure of ability. Second, we find that if we relax the assump-
tion that a, ⌧ , and ⌧w do not vary across groups, we estimate values for the high and
low-B groups that are qualitatively very similar to each other, as shown in columns (2)-
(4). Third, we study two models designed to reduce the residual variation in B, either
by splitting the distribution of B more finely, or by forecasting market wages using an
OLS estimator (which extracts information from a larger set of covariates compared to
the Post-LASSO estimator). When we split B into three groups, application costs range
from 154 ETB to 270 ETB and the correlation is between 0.48 and 0.76. Further, when
42
we use the OLS estimator, the lowest estimate of application costs is 115 ETB and the
lowest estimate of the cost-ability correlation is 0.51. Thus, under both strategies, we
estimate large application costs and a strong cost-ability correlation. While this exer-
cise cannot fully rule out that our estimates may be inflated by residual variation in the
value of the job, it provides evidence of the qualitative robustness of our findings when
this residual variation is plausibly reduced.
V.E The returns of the interventions and policy simulations
In this last subsection, we assess the returns of the interventions and of two counter-
factual policies. Both interventions attract applicants with higher cognitive ability and
thus enable the employer to make better hires. Since cognitive ability is a strong pre-
dictor of productivity and the wage is fixed to the level that was originally posted, this
generates an expected stream of benefits for the employer. Each intervention also en-
tails two types of costs. First, the employer has to pay the direct cost of the intervention
(the cost of the incentive or the higher wage). Second, the employer has to employ sta 
time to review the additional applications.
We calibrate our cost and benefit calculations in order to assess the e ect of the in-
terventions on a single, typical employer recruiting a clerical worker in this market. For
these calibrations, we use the data that we collected from local firm managers. First, we
quantify recruitment costs using managers’ assessment of the time required to review
one more application. On average managers report that this requires about one hour of
work.43 We price this hour at the median salary of the HR sta  who review applications
in these firms. Second, we calibrate the number of applicants in the control group and
the number of jobs on o er using the average of these variables among the firms in our
sample. Third, we compute worker turnover rates and use these to assess the expected
number of months that the worker will spend in the firm (expected tenure is 45 months;
we assume, conservatively, that the high wage is paid only for three months). Finally,
we calibrate the productivity gains from higher worker ability using the Mincerian re-
gressions on local labour market data that we presented in Section I. We summarise
these assumptions and give additional details on our calculations in Appendix D.
We design two counterfactual policies that reduce the upfront costs of the applica-
tion incentive. One drawback of this intervention is that the employer subsidises a large
group of infra-marginal individuals who would have applied for the job in the absence
43We also ask whether there are any financial costs involved in reviewing one more application. The
great majority of managers report that this is not the case. The majority of financial costs are fixed costs,
such as advertisement costs.
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of the incentive. Further, while most of the increase in ability is driven by the high-B
group, the incentive is o ered to both groups. To decrease transfers to infra-marginal
and to low-ability applicants we propose two alternative policies: (i) an application in-
centive that is targeted on the basis of observable demographics (we experiment, in
turn, with o ering the incentive only to women and only to individuals below the me-
dian age),44 (ii) an application incentive that is o ered only to the applicants who score
above a threshold in the test (we set this threshold to the level that fills the positions
on o er in expectation, so in practice under this policy the incentive is o ered to all
hires). These interventions reduce transfers to infra-marginal individuals by exploit-
ing, in turn, the observable information available to employers and the information
available to workers. One important caveat with respect to the second counterfactual
intervention is that our estimates do not take risk aversion into account. Under this in-
tervention, jobseekers are uncertain about whether they will qualify for the incentive.
If risk aversion is large, the incentive will be less attractive than in our simulations.
Further, if it is negatively correlated with ability, the positive e ect on the quality of
the pool of applicants will be less pronounced than what we predict. The returns that
we estimate for this intervention should thus be seen as an upper bound of the true
returns.45
< Table 5 here. >
We present these results in Table 5 below. First, we find that the application incen-
tive has a positive internal rate of return (IRR) of about 9.8 percent. This is above market
interest rates (which were about 5 percent in Ethiopia at the time of the experiment),
and in line with the hurdles rates commonly reported by firms.46 However, the IRR
44To estimate these counterfactuals, we estimate the structural model two more times, using new em-
pirical moments obtained by splitting the sample by age and by gender. We report these new parameter
estimates in Table A57 and A58, and the related moments in Table A59 and A60. The model that explores
heterogeneity by age fits the data well. On the other hand, the model that explores heterogeneity by gen-
der has a poorer fit. This is driven by the fact that, for the incentive intervention, the model predicts
an increase in the ability of female applicants that is only about one fifth of the impact observed in the
data. In our IRR calculations, we thus conservatively augment the simulated impact of this intervention,
reducing the gap between the empirical and simulated moment by 25 percent. Our estimates are hence
likely to be a lower bound of the true returns of this counterfactual intervention.
45For both counterfactual policies, we also assume that treatment does not change participants’ beliefs
about the probability of getting the job. This is justified by the fact that, in the experiment, the incentive
intervention does not have an e ect on these beliefs. We are however unable to test whether the targeted
policies that we examine in the counterfactual analysis may impact beliefs di erently compared to the
untargeted incentive that we have implemented in the field.
46We are not aware of data on the hurdle rates used by firms in Ethiopia or in countries with similar
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estimate is somewhat imprecise and the bootstrapped confidence interval has a nega-
tive lower bound. Thus, while the intervention is attractive in expectation, we cannot
reject that the IRR is di erent from zero (or di erent from a meaningful negative level).
Second, we find that all counterfactual incentive schemes have a large impact on the
return of the intervention. Targeting the incentive to women or to jobseekers below
the median age raises the IRR to 86 percent and 47 percent, respectively. Both of these
schemes substantially reduce the cost of the intervention, as they restrict the number of
applicants that are eligible for the incentive. At the same time, they generate large gains
in applicant ability, since they target the incentive on the demographics that drive the
impacts of the intervention. Thus, they raise the IRR considerably; and the bootstrap ex-
ercise suggests that these counterfactual estimates are significantly di erent from zero.
Third, when the incentive is o ered to all hires, the cost of the intervention decreases
dramatically, and the IRR goes up to 382 percent. However, as discussed above, this
large IRR should be interpreted as an upper bound, as it does not consider the role of
risk aversion.
Our IRR estimates do not measure whether the intervention generates overall wel-
fare gains. The fact that high-B individuals drive the impacts on ability (Table A27)
suggests that application incentives may have positive e ects on the allocation of talent,
favouring those high-ability jobseekers who stand to gain the most from being o ered
the job. However, we do not have access to the comprehensive labour market data that
would be required to credibly quantify these allocative gains. In particular, we do not
have information on how other firms are a ected by the policy or on workers’ long-term
outcomes. We thus do not provide an estimate of welfare e ects.
VI Discussion
In this section we discuss two important questions that follow from our findings. First,
we study whether employers value cognitive ability and whether they are aware of the
impacts of application incentives on the quality of the applicant pool. Second, in order
to shed light on the external validity of our results, we present evidence from other
contexts on application costs and their correlation with applicant ability.
macroeconomic conditions. A recent survey by the Bank of England finds that most firms in the UK
adopt hurdle rates between 5 and 15 percent (Saleheen et al., 2017).
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VI.A Do managers value cognitive ability and are they aware of the
benefits of application incentives?
We address these questions through a second novel experiment that studies the prefer-
ences and expectations of managers at firms recruiting for clerical positions (see section
I for a description of how these firms are sampled). This experiment enables us to ex-
plore two possible reasons why firms in Addis Ababa do not use application incentives.
First, firm managers may not value general cognitive ability and thus may not rank ap-
plicants from the incentive group above control applicants. Alternatively, managers
would like to recruit workers with higher cognitive ability, but do not expect that the
application incentive will attract these workers.
In the first task, we study whether firm managers rank treatment group applicants
above control applicants. To incentive this task, we o er to invite one person from our
sample of applicants to make a new job application at the manager’s firm. The man-
ager can determine who this person will be by ranking the standardised CVs of three
selected applicants.47 We sample one applicant from each experimental group. At this
point of the experiment, however, the manager has not been informed about the two
interventions nor about how the three applicants have been selected. On the CVs, we
report applicants’ education, age, work experience, GPA and the results from the Raven
and conscientiousness tests (Figure A15 shows a sample CV). We select triplets of ap-
plicants that reproduce as closely as possible the average di erences in these charac-
teristics between groups.48 After the manager ranks the CVs, we randomly draw two
of the three CVs and invite the person with the higher rank to make an application at
the manager’s firm. This last feature ensures that the manager is incentivised to report
truthfully her preferences over the three candidates.
We find that both interventions improve the quality of the applicant pool in the eyes
of local firm managers. We show this result in Table 6 using a series of linear probability
47Kessler et al. (2019) propose a similar methodology — called Incentivised Resume Rating — to elicit
employer preferences. There are two main di erence between their methodology and ours: (i) they use
fictitious CVs while we rely on real CVs, and (ii) in their design, employers assess CVs by reporting a
cardinal score, while in our design employers report a rank.
48We do this in three steps. First, we generate a list of all possible triplets. Second, for each triplet, we
calculate the distance between (i) the di erences in ability among the applicants in the triplet and (ii) the
average di erences in ability among their respective experimental groups (with a simple sum-of-square-
di erences statistic and three measures of ability: GPA, Raven score and conscientiousness). Third, we
choose the sixteen triplets that have the minimum value of this distance statistic. We then randomly
allocate a triplet to each manager. Across triplets, we also randomly change the order with which the
candidates from the three experimental groups are presented.
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models. In the first two columns, the dependent variable is a dummy for individuals
who are ranked first. In the third column, the dependent variable is a dummy for being
ranked first or second. We find that applicants from the incentive group are a significant
36.9 percent more likely to be ranked first than control applicants, and a significant
37.4 percentage points more likely to be ranked first or second. In column two, we
only consider applicants from the control and incentive groups. We find that incentive
group applicants are ranked above control group applicants about 70 percent of the
times.
< Table 6 here. >
In the second task, we test whether managers can predict the e ects of the appli-
cation incentive. We first give managers detailed information on the experiment and
then ask them to forecast the impacts of the application incentive on application rates
and applicant ability (as measured by the Raven test). To measure ability at di erent
points of the distribution, we obtain forecasts of (i) the average Raven score and (ii) the
average Raven score among the 100 highest-scoring applicants. Further, before fore-
casts are made, we disclose the application rates and Raven test scores of applicants in
the control and high wage groups in order to anchor managers’ priors on the correct
level of these variables. We reward managers for the accuracy of one randomly drawn
forecast.
We find that managers make considerable forecasting errors and generally under-
estimate the impacts of the application incentive on applicant ability. In Figure 8 we
plot the distribution of managers’ forecasts. On average, managers expect that the ap-
plication incentive will increase application rates and decrease applicant ability. In par-
ticular, they predict that performance on the Raven test will fall by about one correct
answer, both at the mean and at the top of the distribution. In reality, performance on
the Raven test improves by about one correct answer in both cases. Overall, about 66
percent of managers underestimate the level of cognitive ability of the applicants in the
incentive group.
In sum, the evidence in this section shows that managers value applicant cognitive
ability, but are unaware of the cognitive ability gains generated by application incen-
tives.
< Figure 8 here. >
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VI.B External validity
We find several pieces of evidence suggesting that job search and applications costs
are large in a number of contexts. In China, Chang (2009) reports qualitative evidence
that manufacturing workers do not apply for attractive jobs when the application centre
is too far from their place of residence. In Ghana, Hardy and McCasland (2017) pro-
vide evidence that entry fees for apprentices create labor constraints for small firms. In
South Africa, Abel et al. (2017) show that jobseekers apply to fewer jobs per week than
they would like to. A psychological intervention is only able to reduce this intention-
behaviour gap by a small amount, suggesting that other constraints such as credit con-
straints may be responsible for jobseekers’ failure to meet their job application targets.
In OECD countries, employers often reimburse applicants for travel expenses incurred
for job interviews. In Germany, this is mandated by the Civil Code.49 In other markets,
this emerges as a stable equilibrium outcome. An example of this is the economics job
market, where most universities reimburse applicants for ‘flyout’ expenses. In all of
these contexts, job application costs emerge as a salient constraint for jobseekers.
We also find observational evidence suggesting that these costs may be positively
correlated with worker ability in several settings. In India, Choudhury and Khanna
(2014) leverage micro-data from a large technology firm to show that hires from remote
small towns (who face larger search costs for formal work) have higher ability and are
more productive than hires from large cities (who face lower search costs). In the US,
Paserman (2008) structurally estimates that, among unmarried jobseekers with low-
wage work experience, high-ability jobseekers face search costs that are almost 5 times
higher than those of low ability jobseekers.50 Finally, there is evidence of similar se-
lection dynamics in the context of college admissions. For example, Black et al. (2020)
study the impacts of a policy granting public university access to all Texas students
in the top 10 percent of their high-school class. They find that those top students from
schools with poor university placement records who attend college thanks to the policy
— a group that presumably faces large costs to access higher education — have better
graduation rates than the students from the traditional “feeder” schools who are dis-
placed by the policy. Overall, this evidence suggests that, across a variety of contexts,
high-ability marginal applicants tend to face high application costs. In these settings,
49See §670 of the German Civil Code (BGB) and https://www.euraxess.de/germany/information-
assistance/work-permit/faq-working.
50US jobseekers with low-wage employment experience are likely to be the most comparable group to
the jobseekers in our sample. For jobseekers with experience in better-paid positions, Paserman (2008)
finds a negative cost-ability correlation.
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reducing application costs can improve both the e ciency and equity of the selection
process.
One final important consideration is that the cost-ability correlation may be a ected
by di erent types of labour market shocks. For example, the introduction of low-cost
online job portals may equalise individuals’ ability to search for work, and thus elim-
inate the di erential dynamic selection pattern we have documented. Furthermore,
temporary negative shocks in demand may dampen the job-search advantage of low-
cost individuals. These observations suggest that the mechanism we have uncovered
may evolve over time.
VII Conclusion
In a worker recruitment experiment in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia we show that employers
can use application incentives to attract applicants with higher cognitive ability. We
estimate a structural model of applications decisions and find that the positive e ect
of application incentives follows from the fact that application costs are large, hetero-
geneous and, surprisingly, positively correlated with jobseeker ability. Finally, using a
high-frequency panel dataset on job-search decisions, we present evidence suggesting
that the correlation between application costs and jobseeker ability is likely to be driven
by a dynamic selection mechanism: low-cost, high-ability jobseekers find work faster
than high-cost jobseekers with similar ability and thus quit job search earlier.
Our experimental evidence on how application costs a ect firms’ ability to recruit
talented workers generates a number of leads for future research. A first natural ques-
tion is how incentives interact with interventions that improve the quality of screening
(Autor and Scarborough, 2008). Second, our study does not investigate the potential
dynamic gains from relaxing labour constraints. If personnel ability is complementary
to capital and technology (Bender et al., 2016), these gains could be large. More broadly,
our results suggest that unequal access to labour markets can distort the selection and
allocation of talent. This central insight can help design future labour market policy.
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Figures and tables for inclusion in the main text
Figure 1: Most important HR problem
Notes: This figure reports data from our survey of firms hiring clerical workers. We report the distribution
of managers’ responses to the question ‘What is the most important HR problem faced by your firm?’.
Sample used: all managers.
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Figure 2: Low savings and Raven test score among jobseekers
by fortnight
Notes: In this figure, we plot the coe cients from a battery of regressions of standardised Raven test
scores on a dummy for having below-median savings. We estimate a separate regression for each fort-
night, each time restricting the sample to those individuals who are out of work and searching for em-
ployment in that particular fortnight. This regression thus estimates the correlation between savings and
Raven test scores among the individuals that are actively looking for employment in a given fortnight.
Changes in this correlation are driven by selection in and out of job search. The data comes from the
high-frequency panel of Abebe et al. (2020). The jobseekers in this dataset are interviewed on the phone
every two weeks for a period of one year. The same jobseekers also complete face-to-face baseline and
endline interviews before and after the phone survey. For logistical reasons, the first three fortnights
and the last fortnight of the phone survey have much fewer observations than the other fortnights and
we thus drop them. We include face-to-face baseline and endline observations and consider them as the
first and last fortnight of the panel. For each regression, we report the point estimate of the coe cient
on the dummy variable for having below-median savings and a 90 percent confidence interval obtained
using robust standard errors.
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Figure 3: High distance and Raven test score among jobseekers
by fortnight
Notes: In this figure, we plot the coe cients from a battery of regressions of standardised Raven test
scores on a dummy for living at a distance from the city centre above the median in the sample. We esti-
mate a separate regression for each fortnight, each time restricting the sample to those individuals who
are out of work and searching for employment in that particular fortnight. This regression thus estimates
the correlation between distance and Raven test scores among the individuals that are actively looking
for employment in a given fortnight. Changes in this correlation are driven by selection in and out of
job search. The data comes from the high-frequency panel of Abebe et al. (2020). The jobseekers in this
dataset are interviewed on the phone every two weeks for a period of one year. The same jobseekers also
complete face-to-face baseline and endline interviews before and after the phone survey. For logistical
reasons, the first three fortnights and the last fortnight of the phone survey have much fewer observa-
tions than the other fortnights and we thus drop them. We include face-to-face baseline and endline
observations and consider them as the first and last fortnight of the panel. For comparability with Figure
2, we restrict the sample to observations with non-missing savings. Results are qualitatively unchanged
if we do not apply this restriction. For each regression, we report the point estimate of the coe cient on
the dummy variable for living at above-median distance from the city centre and a 90 percent confidence
interval obtained using robust standard errors.
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Figure 4: Illustration of the e ect of an application incentive
(noisy-selection case, ⇢z > 0)
61
Figure 5: Illustration of the e ect of an application incentive
(noisy-ability case, ⇢z > 0)
62
Figure 6: Impacts on the distribution of applicant cognitive ability
Incentive treatment
Notes: This figure plots the distribution of cognitive ability among control and application incentive
applicants in the experiment. Sample used: all applicants (incentive and control groups).
63
Figure 7: Moment fit
(a) Noisy ability, core moments (b) Noisy ability, additional moments
(c) Noisy selection, core moments (d) Noisy selection, additional moments
Notes: This figure plots the simulated moments against the empirical moments for all models presented
in Table 4. All moments are normalised using the standard deviation of the respective empirical moment
(which we obtain through a bootstrap). The underlying moments are reported in Table A48 -Table A51
of the online Appendix. For ease of representation, we plot the application rate in each treatment group
(as opposed to the treatment e ect on application rates) and average ability in each treatment group (as
opposed to the treatment e ect on average ability).
64
Figure 8: Forecast accuracy of firm managers
Notes: This figure reports managers’ forecasts about the outcomes of the experiment. The circle shows
the true value of the variable forecasted. The box-plot shows the distribution of the forecasts: (i) the
horizontal line inside the box shows the mean forecast, (ii) the box shows the interquartile range of the
forecasts, (iii) the upper and lower caps on the whiskers show the minimum and maximum forecasts.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Incentive = Wage (p) 0.000
Obs. 4689
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is a dummy capturing whether the respondent has ap-
plied to the experiment’s job. The second to last row reports the p-value of a test of the null hypothesis
that the two treatments have the same e ect. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Sample
used: baseline sample.
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Table 3: Cognitive ability
Mean Percentile
90th 75th 50th 25th 10th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Incentive 0.248 0.229 0.229 0.170 0.412 0.079
(0.112) (0.110) (0.117) (0.133) (0.173) (0.250)
[0.081] [0.115] [0.148] [0.607] [0.053] [1.000]
High Wage 0.194 0.202 0.227 0.075 0.280 0.155
(0.110) (0.108) (0.112) (0.131) (0.165) (0.227)
[0.225] [0.182] [0.130] [0.852] [0.271] [0.743]
Control value -0.0000 2.312 1.477 0.356 -1.238 -2.697
Incentive = Wage (p) 0.574 0.795 0.983 0.448 0.371 0.741
Obs. 2386 2386 2386 2386 2386 2386
Notes: Estimates from OLS (Column 1) and quantile (Columns 2-6) regressions. The dependent variable
is the index of cognitive ability. The second-to-last row reports the p-value of a test of the null hypothesis
that the treatments have the same e ect. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Sharp-
ened q-values (Benjamini et al., 2006) are reported in brackets. q-values control the false discovery rate
for the multiple tests of the same hypothesis for di erent indices of ability. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test
rejects the equality of the distribution of cognitive ability in the control and incentive groups (p=.038)
and marginally fails to reject the equality of the distribution of cognitive ability in the control and wage
groups (p=.107). Sample used: all applicants.
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Table 4: Parameter estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Low B
µC 136.320 187.950 273.300 206.800
(20.69) (15.99) (32.21) (234.69)
 C 192.840 192.010 206.450 208.570
(35.90) (42.51) (317.59) (1839.90)
⇢ 0.640 0.643 0.626 0.625
(0.06) (0.05) (0.21) (0.22)
High B
µC 217.310 287.910 383.410 286.170
(15.66) (14.53) (52.01) (60.86)
 C 245.100 239.910 260.400 263.320
(38.40) (49.90) (287.95) (1182.06)
⇢ 0.572 0.581 0.607 0.608







⌧ 19.063 15.781 57.938 58.556
(15.93) (13.80) (91.39) (358.42)
⌧
w 55.732 35.763 113.200 153.570
(53.50) (87.08) (306.60) (1170.18)
Information Noisy ability Noisy selectivity
Moments 14 16 14 16
Goodness of fit 2.2637 2.3389 2.2516 2.2654
Notes: The table shows parameter estimates obtained using minimum distance estimation. Columns (1)
and (2) report estimates for the noisy-ability case. Columns (3) and (4) report estimates for the noisy-
selectivity case. The estimates reported in columns (1) and (3) use fourteen empirical moments. The
estimates reported in columns (2) and (4) use sixteen empirical moments. All empirical and simulated
moments are reported in Tables A48 - A51. The parameters that describe the marginal distribution of
ability are omitted for brevity and are reported in Table A47 in the online Appendix. Standard errors
obtained through a bootstrap of the structural estimation reported in parenthesis. The bootstrap includes
the estimation of B and the demediation procedure. Costs are expressed in Ethiopian Birr.
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Table 5: The returns of the interventions
Incentive given to... High wage
All applicants All hires Female Young
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Internal Rate of Return 9.8 382.5 86.5 47.1 <0
(-18.7, 38.3) (44.6, 720.4) ( 4.3, 168.7) (24.6, 69.6)
Costs
Time costs (month 0) 386 133 77 207.9 485
Incentive (month 0) 5862 300 1017 2439.7 0
Wage costs (months 1-3) 0 0 0 0 4800
Benefits
Value of higher ability 168 61 65 114.2 211
(months 1-45)
Notes: Cost-benefit analysis. We consider five interventions: (i) the application incentive as implemented
in the experiment (column 1), (ii) an incentive o ered conditional on meeting the selectivity threshold set
by the employer in the application test (column 2), (iii) an incentive o ered to all women (column 3), (iv)
an incentive o ered to all individuals below the median age (column 4), (v) the high wage intervention
as implemented in the experiment (column 5). The figures reported in columns 1, 2 and 5 are based on
the parameters estimated for the noisy-ability case, using the core set of moments. The first row reports
the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of each intervention. Below the IRR we report a 90 percent confidence
interval obtained with a bootstrap. In the remaining rows we report costs and benefits expressed in
Ethiopian Birr. The benefit of the intervention is given by the increase in the expected cognitive ability of
hires, multiplied by the return to cognitive ability estimated using local labour market data. We consider
three types of potential costs: (i) the time required to assess the additional applications, (ii) the cost of
the incentive, (iii) the wage increase. All assumptions used in the computation of costs and benefits are
discussed in detail in Appendix D.
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Table 6: Firm managers’ ranking of workers
Ranked first Ranked first or second
(1) (2) (3)
Incentive 0.369 0.456 0.374
(0.053) (0.064) (0.055)
High wage 0.154 0.287
(0.048) (0.062)
Control mean 0.159 0.272 0.446
Incentive = Wage (p) 0.001 0.069
No. managers 195 195 195
Obs. 585 390 585
Notes: OLS regression. The dependent variable is indicate in the column’s heading. The unit of obser-
vation is an applicant-manager pair. We thus have three observations per manager. In column (2) we
drop applicants from the high wage group. Standard errors clustered at the manager level reported in
parenthesis. Sample used: all managers.
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